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Abstract 
The implications of extended and intensive use of near field communications (NFC) are far reaching 
for new business applications, for the delivery of public services such as transport, and for public 
policy. This technology is transformative for a large number of applications and has stimulated 
innumerable innovative forms, but so far there has been insufficient insight expressed in discussions 
about its impact and risks.  The purpose of these studies is to assess the character and use of contactless 
payment technologies and the future of NFC with a focus on what are by far its most extensive 
applications in public transport. We use our evidence to structure a new understanding of the economic, 
business, legal and policy aspects of its anticipated widespread growth, especially as embodied in 
mobile devices. 
NFC wireless technology allows information to be exchanged, via radio signals, between two NFC-
enabled devices over short distances. To date the most extensively used form of payment is contactless 
travel card tickets. However, NFC is increasingly being used on mobile phones with an 'electronic 
wallet' function, which allows people to make payments and manage other forms of exchange. 
The lack of insightful discussion of these far reaching effects brings significant risks.  They include a 
new level of intensity of the pressure to undermine (or alter) principles and practices of safeguarding 
privacy.  They raise concerns about the special status of children and other unwary users whose privacy 
might be compromised.  They also intensify the concern we might have about breaches of data security 
or data loss, given the ability of NFC data to include location as well as payment information. 
We review the regulations and policies governing NFC in Europe and Asia and the incentives and 
barriers to the commercial development of NFC. The use of contactless payment technologies in public 
transport ticketing schemes – such as the Oyster card in London and the Octopus card in Hong Kong 
provide case studies for the research.  Our investigation is based on legal and business analyses, case 
studies and considerations of the changing functionalities of NFC.  We have also interviewed numerous 
experts in regulation, policy and business about trends in investment and policy.   
An overriding concern is that NFC will fail to achieve its potential.  Until problems such as those 
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associated with privacy and regulations are overcome there will be insufficient progress on extending 
the business models in ways stakeholders such as public authorities, consumers and investors expect.  
Given the large scale of activities, any such delay would be extremely costly both in terms of 
investments and in terms of the expectations of this element of the ubiquitous digital infrastructure. 
This report has eight sections.  The first section covers the introduction to the research. Section two is a 
summary of the aspects to be taken into account for NFC and its application for public transport. 
Section 3 describes the theoretical foundations of the analysis. Section 4 focuses on the contentious 
issues emerging from NFC, privacy and business models. Section 5 discusses the implications of 
extending the NFC public transport experiences to other business cases. Section 6 presents our view on 
the future of NFC and its competitive environment. Section 7 addresses the key relationships that will 
determine NFC’s future, and section 8 presents our conclusions and our views on policy implications.  
We also present our case about the implications for business models development.  The document 
concludes with an appendix of cases studied.  
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1. Introduction 
The rate and direction of the diffusion of near field communication (NFC) technologies and the very 
character of business applications will be deeply affected by privacy considerations.  Hundreds of 
millions of people are familiar with payment and ticketing cards that use contactless techniques 
because of the expansion of public transport payment systems such as those in Hong Kong, Tokyo and 
London since the late 1990s.  Each of the cities researched is currently operating –at different levels of 
development – some kind of NFC implementation plan. While the potential utility of these 
technologies is clear, the business models that are likely to succeed are going to rest on the extension of 
such systems. Herein we can see the shaping powers of the interactions among the technology, the 
commercial applications that take hold, their legal environment and the public policies that emerge. 
Increasingly, every transaction a user makes, overtly or not, generates data. Even as concerns about 
privacy increase amongst consumers, most are unaware of how every action they take generates 
particular kinds of transactional information.  Yet, users are keen to have more extensive services and 
equally demand that they remain in control over how consequent data are processed. With NFC, this 
seemingly contradictory situation is going to grow even more complicated as new services and the 
emergence of concerns of abuse will develop complementarily. If the risks of privacy abuse are not 
properly assessed at an early stage, NFC may suffer from the same levels of criticism that have 
damaged confidence in technologies such as biometrics and RFID. NFC commercial proponents have 
been trying to distinguish NFC from RFID, in part because of the heavy regulatory burden associated 
with RFID.  This has to some degree obfuscated public discussion about NFC’s potential uses. Yet in 
our discussions with regulators we found that they are inclined to regard NFC and RFID as the same 
types of technologies, and will likely regulate similarly. 
NFC is a technology that traces its technical heritage to radio-frequency identification [RFID] that was 
first applied on a large scale to public transport in the late 1990s. It lends itself to various business 
models that integrate the social, legal and practical features of its functionality. Since 2004 when the 
industry body, the NFC Forum, was founded, it has attracted a great deal of investment focused on 
applications for business areas beyond public transport. Although there has been a spate of tentative 
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business models for mass applications, there is still a confusion of regulatory, legal and policy 
responses to the use of the technology. 
Any transaction that involves the sharing of information additionally requires us to consider security 
implications.  Any transaction that involves personal information requires us to consider privacy 
implications.  In turn, when we are considering transactions such as payments, both privacy and 
security play essential roles and complement each other.  In these ways the expansion of mobile 
payments has significant effects upon privacy for users and the sharing of data. These effects in turn 
have a strong impact upon the creation of new business models. Since the late 1990s the expansion of 
RFID and NFC cards used for public transport payments have made many ordinary people familiar 
with the use of these technologies. However, familiarity with a technology does not mean that the 
privacy and security issues have been resolved adequately. 
The privacy regulations applied to electronic ticketing operations, in principle, fall under national data 
protection laws. It has become fashionable to complain that regulation is always behind innovation; but 
this has always been the case.  This criticism could be applied to data protection law; though data 
protection law is the instantiation of a set of principles about how personal information is to be 
governed, and processed and are, for the most part, technology-neutral.  What tends to be lacking is 
adequate awareness amongst regulators until they are called into action, if action is even within their 
remit. NFC poses a set of unique problems for understanding the implications for privacy, and in turn, 
privacy regulations.  Despite that, NFC does not necessarily pose many radically new conditions.  We 
can come to comprehend the privacy risks and opportunities based on prior experiences in other 
domains.  
A major complication is that users rarely seek legal or regulatory remedies for perceived privacy 
infringements arising from new technologies. In turn, courts and regulators tend to be unaware of how 
new technologies function and understandably base their judgments on established precedents that 
often refer to technologies that no longer bear close resemblance to those in current use.  It may take 
years, and sometimes decades for adequate legal responses to arising privacy cases.   Users of new 
technologies need new abilities to comprehend their threats, just as the providers of new technologies 
need new methods to promote confidence in their techniques.  The combination of that comprehension 
and the techniques and services that businesses and public bodies offer will be a determining factor in 
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the character and rate of the diffusion of NFC. 
The maturity of the NFC technology and its embedding in mobile phones raises new opportunities for 
contactless payments. At the same time the creation of virtual wallets containing not only transport 
cards but also any other type of card, from credit cards to identity cards, loyalty cards, and bonus cards, 
etc. has stimulated the formation of many new business models. One implication of this technology is 
the pervasiveness of data collection about contactless payments. Data include the location and volume 
of transactions, as well as time and date. Many users do not sufficiently understand or have a full 
appreciation of what data are collected, where they are held and how they might be used in the future. 
Although there is a comprehensive legal framework aimed to protect the privacy of individuals, with 
some international variations, the application of this technology gives rise to new challenges and the 
legal ramifications are not yet well understood.  These have contributed to an industry-wide sense of 
uncertainty about the future of the technology. 
The resulting period of instability is likely to continue for a bit longer, during which time a common 
list of risks/problems/challenges will continue to arise.  These include strategies (and also tactics) 
associated with business models to introduce mass applications of NFC and contractual agreements 
associated with working out how to distribute the risks and rewards. 
Our research approach therefore includes engaging with experts, as they have experiences and 
perspectives that may assist in illuminating some of the risks.  In essence, we learn from past 
experiences and hear their thoughts on future developments. Our goal is not to provide a 
comprehensive statement of risks, but rather to identify the key discourses, the technological options, 
and the tools available to developers that could promote confidence in new applications of NFC. 
2. NFC and Public Transport 
The cases of Oyster in the UK and Octopus in Hong Kong are examples of the successful 
implementation of contactless cards and they have stimulated applications in hundreds of other 
municipal transport systems. The Oyster case is significant in terms of how the card emerged as a 
brand, the problems that came from the use and abuse of the technology, and the later “openness” of 
transactions on London public transport. These will soon be extended to other types of contactless 
cards e.g. contactless credit cards and NFC mobile payments (a goal for the London Olympics of 
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2012). The Octopus card in Hong Kong, which was initiated in 1997/98, is a contrasting case as the 
Hong Kong authorities tried very hard from the start to create a brand and added value to the use of the 
card beyond its function as a transport ticket. It has also suffered from a number of well-publicised 
violations of prohibitions on privacy rules, which have influenced policy actions taken by regulators to 
tighten those rules. 
2.1 Travel card technology systems 
A key objective of new transport payment systems is to improve public transport service levels while 
satisfying passenger needs. A typical transport card system has the following three main components as 
shown in Figure 1: 
1. An interoperable card: A passenger should need only one travel card through which it is 
possible to use the transportation system and its different modes in full. 
2. A one-stop-shop: A passenger should be able to buy all necessary public transport 
tickets/tokens through one sales channel (online, over the counter, and/or at vending 
machines).  
3. An interoperable reader: A single interoperable reader should be able to validate all forms of 
travel transactions, such as when entering and exiting the transport system. 
Travel Cards
Card  readers
Point of sales
Internet purchase
Travel 
information  
system
CRM  system
Customer 
information
Event 
informationDepot 
system
 
Figure 1.The simplest form of public transport travel card based payment systems can be divided into 
three parts: the travel card, service points, and the central system (adapted from Sulonen et al., 2010). 
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The travel card is a smart contactless card that transmits data over short distances.  The card contains 
stored data including the travel currency and amount, transactional information, and a unique 
identifier. The current trip is stored in a card application that acts as a ticket. Typically millions or tens 
of millions of cards are issued in an urban or regional card scheme. 
Card readers collect data stored on the travel card. A reader interacts with the travel card and 
communicates to the information handling system where that passenger starts and ends the current 
journey. With various levels of precision the card reader stores this information and in some cases 
interacts with the central system. Typically tens of thousands of card readers are installed. For buses, 
trams and the like, vehicle equipment details and sales information from card readers are transferred to 
the central system through mostly wireless telecom connections. 
A centralised information clearing system is used where event data are collected and which manages 
the transport card system.  It can be divided into two parts: event handling and client 
management. Event handling keeps track of current and future event information and processing, 
including error handling and recovery. Customer relationship management facilities deal with 
maintaining the registry, billing and reporting. The central clearing system contains essential databases 
storing transaction information and customer data. If the central clearing system is a shared system, 
several travel card systems can be connected to each other. Connection can be made directly to the 
central terminal in different systems, or events can be routed to the terminal's central system in batches 
via the depot. 
2.2 The context of NFC in transport 
The first transport system to implement contactless payment was in Hong Kong when it deployed its 
Octopus card system in 1998.   Other early adopters include Japan Rail East, which initiated a 
contactless Felica card which was launched in November 2001 at train stations within 100 km of 
central Tokyo. Later on, a mobile phone NFC ‘travel card’ called Suica Mobile was launched in 2006 
by NTT DoCoMo. Oyster was introduced in London in 2003, and since then there has been a 
significant reduction in individual paper tickets sold.1  
																																																																		
1		A change in fare differentials has further encouraged the take up of Oyster cards. Over the five years 
to the end of 2007, the total number of ticketing transactions on bus and Underground services 
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Now many industry analysts have called for national roll-out strategies in the West to achieve critical 
mass for contactless cards, particularly on mobile phones.  They argue that the benefits of such a drive 
would include efficient transport ticketing and convenient ways for users to store numerous loyalty 
cards in their mobile phone, while being able to monitor the usage and benefits through a graphic user 
interface on smartphones. Starting in 2004 various initiatives were launched by handset makers, 
carriers and service providers to implement and pilot contactless on mobile devices, resulting in NFC 
interfaces now being included in most mobile operating systems. 
Many stakeholders have run pilots experimenting with NFC adoption and usability.  These applications 
range widely and different kinds of business models have been put in place. The Transport for London 
(TfL) authority, for instance, is responsible for the planning, implementation and revenue collection of 
the Oyster card system. This is different from the case of Hong Kong, where the Octopus card was an 
initiative of local transport operators led by the metro operator, MTR, which owns 57% of the shares 
(Chan and Foster, 2009). These pilots consider all “flavours” of contactless payment, which include 
transport-specific transactions (as with the Oyster card), more general types of payment systems (e.g. 
Octopus), and NFC enabled mobile services  These have proved important for public transport 
operators to determine the possible shortcomings and improvements to the local NFC implementation.  
NFC payment systems are often celebrated for offering benefits to public transport authorities, 
operators and passengers (Mezghani, 2008). These benefits are often expressed in terms of value 
creation for each of these main stakeholders. 
Public authorities claim that there are benefits derived from the creation of seamless journeys in public 
transport networks, the unification of ticketing systems, new sources of marketing data, better control 
of revenues and subsidies, the ability to extend the scheme to other modes of transport (e.g. taxis), the 
reduced cost of selling tickets, and improving the image of public transport.  
Operators value the direct benefits from the potential of gaining new customers with modern 
approaches to ticketing, the increase of medium term operating profit and reduction in fraud, reduction 
in the use of cash, reduced cost of selling tickets, reduced maintenance costs, improving cash flow, 
increased speed of boarding (e.g. on buses), valuable opportunities to add “new services”, and new 
																																																																																																																																																																																												
combined has been reduced by nearly 60% (Transport for London, 2010). 
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sources of marketing data for public transport management. 
When spoken for, it is often claimed that passengers benefit from convenience and speed, the removal 
of the need to carry cash for payments, apparently seamless journeys in multimodal, multiple public 
transport schemes, easier ways to reload value or renew passes (e.g. pay-as-you-go schemes), the 
ability to issue a new card easily when it has been lost or stolen, and additional integrated services that 
can be appreciated as they become available. 
In 2008 and 2009, research reports funded by the European Commission on public transport and the 
implementation of ticketing systems proposed a series of recommendations for the operation of those 
systems (Mezghani, 2008; Elliot & Whitcombe, 2009)2.  These reports were particularly concerned 
about establishing new concepts of fares, for example in determining the responsibility for setting 
prices and for fare structures, ticketing (pricing spectrum and fare integration), types of electronic or 
mobile scheme, type of technology, interoperability, and the exploitation of e-ticketing data (e.g. 
information related to operations, cards and journeys), plus the analysis of how to calibrate the broader 
impact of e-ticketing schemes in the European context. 
In many European countries where there are multiple travel card systems already in place, there is often 
a temptation to replace current incompatible systems with a new single centralised system.  Examples 
from Finland and the Netherlands national card schemes show how large information systems take a 
long time and many resources to launch.	  As a result, some advocate changes to make the existing 
systems interoperable (Sulonen et al., 2010).  Newly constructed travel systems, especially in Asia, 
benefit from the opportunity to design-in these technologies from the outset. 
A new problem then arises as we try to make fare systems interoperable:  each component system is 
likely to be built quite differently3.  Introducing interoperability in a system where there are different 
																																																																		
2	The EU has multiple programmes researching the use of RFID and NFC as part of its FP7 research 
programme. The projects cover a wide range of areas, and there have been many reports written on 
experiences in the use of the technology in public transport from different locations in Europe. 
3	London has a fully integrated fare system determined by TfL, however, it is not possible to use the 
Oyster card in any of the other big cities in England, such as Manchester or Birmingham. In the Finnish 
case, the fare system when escalated at national level has encountered many problems when trying to 
integrate it all using contactless payments. In the Netherlands, integration at national level using 
contactless cards has been completed successfully, although there was from the outset minimal 
problems for integration. 
		 12
back-end systems, data models, and security frameworks is expensive and prone to flaws. To guarantee 
interoperability, all involved transport operators will have to develop clear business rules, detailed and 
descriptive rights and duties as well as roles and responsibilities, established distribution of revenues by 
agreement, and standards for security.	
	
2.3 Stakeholders in public transport ticketing systems 
As data are exchanged within these growing systems, it is important that we are aware of the key 
stakeholders who have access to information, what kind of information, and how they process that 
information.  This is important not only for governing a system but also ensuring that the system is 
legally compliant, particularly when dealing with information about individuals.  
Modern transport payment systems merge information about our movements, our locations, and our 
finances.  Information is likely to be processed by a number of organisations.  As we move to new NFC 
transport systems involving mobile devices, the number of stakeholders and agencies involved grows 
dramatically.  In turn, these entities have legal obligations to protect personal information.  
As a general case, these can be summarised as shown in Figure 2: 
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Figure	2.	The	roles	of	stakeholders	and	relationships	in	a	generic	mobile	ticketing	system	
Public transport operators appear, in the eyes of users, to be responsible for the protection of 
consumers’ rights while ensuring that they are able to use the transportation network.  The transport 
operators tend to be interested primarily in ensuring that they satisfy their user base while minimising 
the risk of fraud.  The public transport operators therefore verify tickets through a card reader, and this 
reader is enabled with privacy and security enhancements.  
Financial institutions are expected to provide network security for financial transactions, together with 
privacy mechanism for personalised user data and to provide ease of use, access and user control.  
While public transport authorities usually have strict commercial limits to their remit, the commercial 
imperative is a foremost motive for the financial institutions involved. 
Trusted service managers hold the role of assuring compliance in data handling.  This function is very 
much promoted by telecom operators, and chip manufacturers as part of the fully integrated solution 
that provides privacy enhancement tools and services to public transport operators, while offering users 
an interface to manage personal information. 
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Mobile network operators, for NFC mobile ticketing, provide the communication network security over 
mobile internet and also ensure that other public transport operators comply with providing security 
against location tracking and preference threats.  
Handset manufacturers provide NFC device security and are also responsible for mobile handset 
security against information leaks. Depending on the chosen technical implementation on the phones 
available for consumers use, an open debate on the level of security to be provided by such devices is 
required. This debate requires stakeholders to understand, how and when users are faced with the ways 
that services or apps exchange data from the handset with an external system such as the public 
transport authority. Those services or apps can be either downloadable, embedded, or residing in 
browsers. 
2.4 Extending the stakeholders beyond transport 
Seven features that affect dissemination of NFC emerge from the analysis of stakeholders in transport 
that can yield generalisations useful for the analysis of a wide range of applications. We describe these 
as power and authority challenges to stakeholders and to legislators, consumer responses, emerging 
business models, functional alternatives to NFC, conflicts that arise from powers to authenticate or 
verify users and mechanisms, and the prevailing logic that guides financial services organisations. 
 The stakeholder challenge is at the heart of the commercialisation process and is expressed by 
who gets what share of profits; who encroaches on whose commercial/statutory territory; what 
old forms of associations/contracts exist and are likely to survive or what new forms are likely 
to emerge. 
 The legislative challenges mediating among the technology, the privacy rights and the current 
and future regulation of business models: 
a. Regulations such as e-money/m-money directives 
b. Privacy law 
c. Rules and policies associated with jurisdictions (e.g. trade), subsidies (e.g. for 
broadband networks), competition (e.g. pricing; interconnection costs). 
 The role of consumer behaviour taking into account consumer acceptance vis-a-vis privacy. 
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For example, interested parties will be comparing adoption rates internationally and how these 
vary depending on the application, such as whether the implementation is intended primarily  
for transport as opposed to small payments.  Finally, the role of consumer groups’ interests in 
monitoring and judging industry guidelines. 
 New and/or idiosyncratic business models: in particular non-money payment related ones that 
offer opportunities to explore certain transaction and value issues aside from the “mainstream” 
financial and industry concerns.  Examples of this include NFC for queuing, checking in 
services (as with restaurant reservations and flights) and close interpersonal contact for the 
purpose of data exchange.  All this together has implications for e-wallets and any other future 
fully integrated contact services using financial information from customers. 
 Alternative non-NFC based service solutions, to which NFC was promoted as a main solution 
provider (e.g. biometrics; SMS codes; barcodes, etc).  
 Authentication: There are a variety of potential ways to structure authentication that pit SIM 
cards against phone embedded authentication mechanisms, versus network or cloud-based 
procedures, versus some combination of mechanisms and procedures. SIM cards may be too 
slow at the moment for fast throughput in the transport system gates such as those used on the 
London Tube.  However, an embedded NFC in the device could be combined with closed 
system authentication, open standard with a proprietary certification authority, or other 
combinations. Additionally, NFC authentication implementations can increase their utility by 
taking into account if the system will accept multiple identities, unique identities, or multi-
purpose identity.  
 Costs: Some transport operators such as TfL are more concern on relinquishing the control of 
transactions to financial institutions such as credit card issuers. The logic behind this is to 
reduce the back end costs for public transport operators4. Marginal costs provide insufficient 
incentives for TfL to deal with the costs of issuing additional charge or contactless cards. This 
approach is very different from the Hong Kong case, were Octopus acts as a financial 
																																																																		
4		 TFL plans to cut 4% of costs by shutting down Oyster as its functions are integrated into other 
NFC devices	
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institution aimed to provide not only fare collection but all the other services those 
organisations can provide.  
By generalising the roles of stakeholders we can better understand possible configurations and 
alternative structures and relationships.  It is also likely that each stakeholder has an interest that will be 
expressed both technologically, in terms of design, and as relations in service delivery or the conduct of 
business. 
3. Transport Insights 
To understand better the context of NFC for public transport ticketing, we have conducted in-depth 
studies into the use of NFC in public transportation systems in six cities:  primary case studies of 
London, Hong Kong, Helsinki and Tokyo, with supplementary insights on Berlin and Seoul.  Our study 
has focused on the interrelatedness of businesses, the associated technologies and the trends towards 
comprehensive electronic payment systems as well as other applications of NFC for improving 
procedures.5 We address the four interrelated components of NFC within transport systems: 
 The business models for implementing NFC and their economic foundations. 
 The differences among the architecture and technologies. 
 The regulatory regimes affecting both transport operations and consumer rights. 
 The arising privacy challenges. 
																																																																		
5 We have not ventured into the behavioural dimensions of NFC use, although they hold implications 
for our findings and we believe that such research is needed.	
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Figure 3: Key components of the analysis 
The business model opportunities provided by NFC are central to our study.  We study these 
opportunities by looking at the interactions among the technology, regulations, and privacy.   
The case studies were selected in the first instance by taking into account the early adoption and 
success of implementing contactless cards in public transport. The transport systems are long 
established and have confronted (or are currently confronting) changes in stakeholder interrelationships 
and public acceptability.  Many of these systems are also growing and changing as they interact with 
non-transport related business models.  
While we investigated these cases, we focused our attention in particular on the arising information 
systems and, in turn, the privacy risks.  This was often seen in the form of conflicts between traditional 
business models and users’ preferences, such as the unwillingness of users to have personal data 
transferred from network operators to other commercial enterprises for marketing purposes. The 
following sections of this report are structured around a referential theoretical framework linking the 
three elements of the core research to the method of analysis as described in Figure 3.  
3.1 Privacy 
Consumers are concerned about how their personal information is being used without their knowledge 
or consent and increasingly fear that protections are failing them.6 Unless users are informed about how 
																																																																		
6 For example, the 2008 Flash Eurobarometer on Data Protection in the European Union capturing 
‘Citizens’ perceptions’ found high levels of concern across the EU, available at 
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their information is used they will be unaware of the true nature of the risks of misuse and abuse.   
Traditionally, organisations informed users about what they do with their personal information, and this 
allowed users to identify problems. For instance, in banking and credit transactions this comes in the 
form of monthly statements that account for how funds are used.  Users are informed about whom they 
have been interacting with on a reporting basis.  This after-the-fact reporting is usually complemented 
with consent at the point of transaction: users authorise payments, make telephone calls, and actively 
participate in initiating a transaction.   Somewhere along the way there is supposed to be regulatory and 
legal mechanisms that protect the individual and ensure that the organisation complies with basic rules. 
In an online environment some of these interactions are harder to identify; clicks may lead to purchases 
that result in credit card transactions, the individual then receives some notification about the 
transaction in the form of receipts, acknowledgements, and monthly statements.  Nonetheless in both 
these environments questions of consent still arise:  how do we properly inform consumers about what 
is being done with their information and how do we garner their approval?  Regulators, consumers, and 
industry are consequently engaged in intense debates about ‘opt-in’, where consumers must be 
expected actively to consent to information processing, versus ‘opt-out’, where individuals’ personal 
information is used until the individual contests the practice.  There are also potential disputes about 
which organisation is actually responsible for adhering to which privacy rules, particularly across 
contractual relations and borders. 
In the contactless and NFC transaction worlds these challenges are likely to grow.  Public transport 
systems may indicate to consumers that they are conducting a transaction by allowing entry-gates to 
open, or merely a sound acknowledging that the contactless card has been read.  The introduction of 
NFC in transport systems allows for the greater collection of personal information that the individual 
may not be aware of through the use of audit logs.  Transport authorities may know where an 
individual entered a transportation system, the time of day, and when the individual left.  Analysing the 
data sets over time could allow those with access to the data to derive biographical information, even 
travelling partners, and anomalies. Consumers are expected to trust that the system will not wrongly 
charge them, or charge them without their knowledge and consent; and that no one is mining the data. 
																																																																																																																																																																																												
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_225_en.pdf 
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As NFC expands to mobile devices, new opportunities arise.  . Mobile phones have interfaces that may 
permit individuals to keep track of transactions to ensure that there has been no abuse or fraudulent 
activity.  Users may become more aware of how much information is collected because they can see 
the audit logs, and perhaps see exactly what information is being disclosed and how it is being 
processed.  Equally, however, the expansion to mobile devices can increase the risks as new 
stakeholders join in on the processing of personal information. Unless regulated by agreements, 
technology, and possibly law, banks and mobile phone network providers, or even handset and 
applications developers may gain access to travel histories and track individuals’ movements.   Using 
these services may generate new kinds of personal information, allowing new ways to profile 
individuals, while making governance of the information systems more difficult. 
The shift from contactless cards towards NFC payment systems is occurring at a time when consumers 
are being given new and stronger privacy rights.  Privacy laws are proliferating as more countries 
introduce data protection laws that govern the use of personal information by both the public and 
private sectors.  Constitutions and human rights protections provide the foundations for these laws to 
ensure that individuals are not recognised merely as consumers, but also as citizens.  In some 
jurisdictions, such as within the European Union where the Council of Europe’s European Convention 
on Human Rights and the European Union Directive on Data Protection both apply, consumers are 
endowed with fundamental rights that protect them from surveillance by both public and private actors. 
The task then becomes one of finding ways to ensure that new implementations of systems and services 
are compatible with privacy rights.  This resolution is not necessarily easy and settlements are not 
uncontested.  Just as the online behavioural tracking industry has clashed with privacy regulators 
around the world about whether their tracking of internet users comply with privacy laws, we are now 
seeing conflicts emerging about privacy and mobile devices. For instance, when news emerged of some 
mobile devices collecting location data, this gave rise to a variety of actions including a U.S. 
congressional hearing, regulatory queries and assessment (in Canada and Europe), and even court 
action (in California and South Korea).  
NFC has yet to encounter this level of scrutiny, possibly because very little is commonly known about 
how information is shared among services and providers.  The current conventional wisdom is that 
firms that do not turn their attention to privacy needs will alienate customers. How this applies to NFC 
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remains to be seen particularly as implementations move beyond transport systems.  The unique 
character of transport systems as critical public services limits discussions about choice (opt-in and opt-
out, for instance), but as NFC proliferates into more consumer-oriented domains, companies may be 
obliged to earn the trust of consumers through greater protections.   
The long-term trends in corporate information security, which could be extended to corporations 
serving users on the mobile internet, can be described as rising risks of data breaches and changes in 
boundaries.  Reputational risk arises from breaches; reports of breaches of personal data are 
compulsory in several jurisdictions, with the result that businesses are becoming acutely aware of those 
risks.  High profile malicious hacks have brought negative attention to companies that have since acted 
to enhance protections.  Simultaneously, changing boundaries and duty of care arise; users engage with 
a wide array of mobile services and have levels of security far below those applied within financial 
institutions or telecom carriers. As mobile services extend into commerce and payments then all 
stakeholders will have significantly to increase their levels of security. 
Security breaches involving customer data imply privacy breaches with potential implications for 
corporate profitability. An analyst from the European Network and Information Security Agency 
concludes: 
Failure to implement appropriate information security measures might have severe 
consequences for the implicated organisation. Under privacy law, failure to implement 
security measures might result in damages for breach of contractual obligations (e.g. 
negligence or breach of a fiduciary relationship). The increasing statutory obligations that 
have been introduced through laws on banking, data protection and healthcare are an 
additional source of security requirements. Security has become an issue of concern for 
shareholders and management that affects the positioning towards corporate liability. 
(Mitrakas, 2006) 
Interactions such as ‘opting in’ as opposed to ‘opting out’ are embodied in procedures and structured 
relationships between users and vendors and can come to characterise a vendor’s respect for the 
autonomy of a customer.  This leads to preferences that affect business models in relation to the ways 
in which customers are willing to engage in interactions, influenced by their attitudes towards the use 
of personal data.  The mechanisms we use embody these functionalities, for example offering levels of 
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security, providing back up or controls over the operations of mobile devices. 
Some national legislatures and responsible companies have implemented privacy elements central to 
the character of NFC, such as the preference to ‘opt in’. However, other elements create conflicts 
between traditional business models and users’ preferences, such as the unwillingness of users to have 
personal data transferred from network operators to other parties (including companies or government 
agencies), or when interactions leave a data trail. 
As applications converge, the problem arises as to if, when, where, how and why identifiers are used:  
which services and providers will have access to which identifiers, and how can protections and 
safeguards be designed into the technologies?  The use of unique identifiers has long caused 
consternation in public policy debates, and more recently in controversies over how mobile phones and 
operating systems use and share identifiers with applications and third parties.  Unless properly 
considered and designed accordingly, NFC can combine and amplify these perceived concerns as 
individuals can be identified uniquely as they conduct their daily lives in an unprecedented manner. 
While privacy awareness is at an all-time high, we see an increasing diversity of privacy 
understandings occurring as technological capabilities widen.  As many companies have experienced, 
different user groups respond differently to user education, empowerment initiatives and control 
settings, user interfaces, and privacy policies.  The deployment of ubiquitous services and products 
enabled by NFC, particularly when applied to vast infrastructures such as transportation, would have to 
cater simultaneously to all these user groups and populations.  
Stakeholders cannot focus only on risks and threats.  That is, we cannot become overly concerned by 
the need to mitigate risk and worry about when the privacy axe will fall on a poorly-prepared 
stakeholder.  Indeed, there are great opportunities in this domain where users can be empowered 
through advanced techniques to maintain their privacy in new ways.  Just as the OECD noted with its 
work on identity management,7 while there are opportunities for the better use of resources, 
overcoming barriers to growth and fostering innovation, facilitating global services, improving user 
convenience, the OECD also noted that when properly designed and implemented, security and privacy 
																																																																		
7 OECD (2009), “The Role of Digital Identity Management in the Internet Economy: A Primer for 
Policy Makers”, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 160, OECD Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/222134375767 
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can be enhanced through new methods.  These opportunities should be identified and these services 
and products must be amongst the first deployed so that users can see how they meet their own 
interests and not merely the needs of the service providers, application developers, or third-party 
aggregators. 
3.2 Technology 
The most pervasive aspect of the implementation of NFC technology is its current integration with 
mobile devices. Mobile devices offer opportunities to collect and generate large amounts of significant, 
potentially commercially valuable, and highly detailed and possibly intrusive personal information.  
Some guidelines about how these datasets can be collected and should be handled have already become 
influential, but new opportunities are constantly being created. NFC use may create problems that merit 
extensive further investigation. 
The storage and handling of data are affected by the increasing use of outsourcing, virtualization and 
cloud computing.  It could be argued that mobile services have been delivered in a “cloud” way since 
the early days of the mobile internet. Extensive coordination of data among several parties has 
contributed to the ability to deliver digital contents to multiple devices with varied screen sizes and 
capabilities. However, as content delivery is not only carried out within walled gardens controlled and 
verified by one firm but increasingly in a market of multiple service providers, the user can no longer 
be sure of where or how user data are being collected or used. This poses a reputational risk for service 
providers, as users could become reluctant to use new services due to privacy concerns, or draw 
negative conclusions regarding service providers because of problems arising from interactions with 
third parties. Non-trusted service environments could be expected to inhibit business models as users 
become hesitant to engage, which could affect economies of scale and create isolated “service silos”.  
Even as the risk of privacy increases because of the multi-purpose nature of many NFC applications, 
NFC-enabled mobile phones offer defences not generally available with traditional systems like credit 
or loyalty cards.  With interfaces and processing power, it is possible for mobile NFC applications to 
use visualisations, application locks, passcodes, and even biometric tools to govern consent and 
transactions. Some device makers already offer remote functions where the phone can be locked and 
wiped clean of its content, certainly not a feature a lost or stolen wallet can provide. It could therefore 
be argued that using an NFC enabled mobile phone provides some opportunities for greater security 
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than merely swiping a credit card. The mobile phone also offers alternative and innovative ways of 
protecting the identity of users through minimising the flows of personal information using both 
inventive user-interfaces and cryptographic services. This could be applied to the design of NFC 
systems now and would be appreciated by many consumers.8  The worse alternative is to wait for a 
controversy and campaigns to force developers to consider security and privacy, and to then compel a 
change in user behaviour after they have already grown accustomed to more insecure methods. 
3.3 Regulation 
In a perfectly legally compliant world, both public and private sector organisations would identify the 
privacy and security problems in advance of the launch of a new system or service.  They would 
question how their new product and service is compliant with existing laws, and make changes as 
required.  Respecting privacy is more complicated than merely assessing legal compliance.  Despite the 
way that laws and regulations tend to follow well behind technology, the citizen’s right to privacy and 
the citizen’s expectation of privacy are often articulated in effectively technology-neutral principles, 
constitutions, and human rights conventions.   
In addition to being a human right, privacy is also subjective and contextual.  It is often difficult to tell 
in advance exactly what component of a service will give rise to privacy concerns, and in turn, generate 
negative attention. To deal with both of these challenges, in-depth privacy impact assessments (PIAs) 
are used, that include engagement with key stakeholders and external experts to help identify 
previously unforeseen risks. As with recent cases involving new social networking applications, even 
where external reviews were incorporated prior to launch, business critical problems emerged.  It may 
be impossible to identify all the privacy risks in advance because of the complicated nature of this 
domain.  For this reason PIAs focus on communicating how, while designing a new service or 
technology, an organisation comprehensively managed its responsibility to limit the processing of 
personal information, and then stating how the organisation identified any arising risks and explained 
how they are further mitigated. 
When regulatory enforcement finally catches up, the regulators and the judicial bodies will be looking 
to see how much effort went into being careful with the processing of personal information.  
																																																																		
8 Brands, Stefan (2000).  Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and Digital Certificates’, MIT Press.	
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Arguments about changing social norms will not resonate strongly with bodies that are responsible for 
enforcing laws; while evidence displaying how privacy was designed into a system will likely be 
persuasive.	
3.4 Business Models 
The convergence of digital services still provides significant market opportunities to communications 
firms (Karrberg and Liebenau, 2006; Elaluf-Calderwood et al., 2011). That is, what we are seeing now 
is the result of recombining components of separate industries into a new value chain, where a new 
level of interdependence is created, acting as an opposing force against user control by enhancing 
specifiability, verifiability, and predictability. However, in order to establish interoperable standards, 
modular interfaces among technology components must be developed, which is also a prerequisite for 
firms to support integration among partners and suppliers. 
As mutual dependencies exist among markets, profit optimisation would strike a balance between the 
number of users and prices, where one side could subsidise the other. Take the example of a mobile site 
portal: the platform owner has to balance, amongst many things, having an attractive price for users 
while maintaining an attractive revenue share for content providers.  One way of doing this is to devise 
an exchange regime where users’ personal information becomes a source of revenue in itself. It is 
sensible to think that consumers would like to control such payments with their own data, as services 
do not come for free. Cross-subsidies usually consist of fees only, but now we can see the emergence 
of a more varied exchange regime that also covers time, as priced by advertisement agencies, and the 
price that actors need to set on user data. In a functioning market contracts for service exchange need to 
reflect both the simplicity of the technology use and the intricacy of the regulation framing the 
provision of the services.  
The future of NFC seems to be linked to the creation of a system that feeds well into the needs of 
consumers, the use of the technology and regulatory compliance. Hence the components of our model 
can be transposed from the case study of public transport to other business areas such as retailing, 
media services, logistics and social enterprises. 
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4. Contentious issues 
NFC and contactless-enabled transport ticketing systems allow for the vast collection and sharing of 
information.  From the point of view of the contactless card-carrying passenger, it is not clear what 
information is involved, who is holding the information, and how they are using it.  As business models 
change and new ones emerge, we need to be able to understand the implications for privacy. 
4.1 Transport cards 
Transport for London was quick to advertise that one of the benefits of the Oyster scheme was that 
individuals could see online the most recent transaction history, if they chose to register to do so. This 
data-rich functionality complemented features such as automatic topping up of the card when the 
balance became depleted, and disabling and replacing the card in the event of its loss or theft.  In 
recognition of sensitivities about the extent of the information accumulated they agreed to minimise the 
data retention of the transaction logs held on their server to eight weeks. Although this is arguably a 
long period of time, this policy was established before the advent contactless cards and later NFC 
systems when such databases were perceived as essential elements for fraud detection and error 
management.  Now with NFC, processing on the device could allow for a reduction in retention 
periods.  TfL also released an anonymous pay as you go (PAYG) option that does not require 
individual identification in order to obtain a card, and credit can be added by using either cash, debit, or 
credit.  Though this option was only launched at a later stage, this pay as you go card is highly popular, 
possibly to some degree because of the consumer perceived higher degree of privacy afforded.   
There is a more confusing array of contentious functionalities associated with expanding our 
considerations to financial services. Financial services are often required to monitor transactions in 
order to detect fraud, and this tends to result in the greater collection of personal information and the 
extension of the period of retention of audit data.  The logging of travel journeys is very different from 
the logging of financial transactions, and so a separate data store may be required and different rules 
may be applied to processing, data retention, access, etc.  When payment systems are central to the 
process it is practically inevitable that law enforcement agencies as well as businesses will pay 
attention to how money laundering may be enabled and disabled. Criminals may take advantage of 
unregulated or insecure systems, followed by disputes that will need to be resolved about how 
centralised systems will ensure individuals against loss or abuse or wide-scale fraud and surveillance. 
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As business models and technologies change, processing of personal information may become more 
pervasive.  A transport system that does not require identity will clash, on privacy grounds at least, 
with the financial world that is increasingly identity-intensive.  Even if a travel card can be purchased 
anonymously (using cash), when a payment credential is used for topping up the account great care is 
required to ensure against de-anonymisation.  That is, if the natural state is currently ‘anonymity’ 
because it is just easier to manage the disbursement of cards, maintaining that anonymity requires great 
care and clear intention when other identifiers come into play.  Anonymity is quickly lost.  It is 
possible that if an individual used a credit card to purchase the anonymous card, then an identifier can 
be linked.  Or at a later time if an individual uses a debit or credit card to add funds to the card, it is 
possible that the unique ID of the card is bound to the identifiers of the payment methods.  This is by 
no means inevitable particularly as obtaining information from banks is not a trivial exercise.  
However, even the aggregation of non-identified information can become identifiable as activity on the 
account can become an identifier in itself; it is easily possible that travel habits and movements, once 
analysed sufficiently, could allow for unique traits to be discerned. 
Bringing together payment and transport systems may yet result in conflicting consumer demands.  As 
with banking, consumers may become more interested in gaining access to transactional logs to see 
how funds have been expended.  Credit cards and bank account logs are familiar to individuals and so 
enhanced transparency may be required as NFC applications move beyond just transport.  Ensuring that 
this can be done on a pay as you go basis, without relying on identity, may prove challenging to other 
legal regimes.  This does not necessarily become easier as users willingly register personal information 
for accounts.  Privacy requirements apply even as ‘anonymity’ is willingly removed and individuals 
merge financial, registration, and travel information.  How the back-offices deal with this is just as 
important as how e-wallets may eventually be designed. 
As governments seek to register individuals’ SIM cards as though they were bank accounts or 
passports, and the mobile devices are linked with payment systems with their own identifiers, the best-
case scenario may be that there will be mayhem of identifiers, combined with regulatory conflict. For 
instance, the sharing of information across institutions, from TfL to other transport networks, or to 
other institutions in the case of a payment system, requires re-analysis.  The use of a single persistent 
identifier would be highly problematic, as it will allow for the profiling of customers at various points 
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of sale and may increase the likelihood of fraud, particularly if this ‘identifier’ is also a payment card 
number.  While credit card companies have detailed security standards for vendors, travel card systems 
may need to build some of these protections into their more processing-capable technologies. A 
multiplicity of identifiers, with the lack of an identifier by default, that are directed and unlinked is not 
only the privacy ideal, it is a representation of the fragmented world we live in.  Convergence is a 
threat in itself. 
The case of Hong Kong also provides insights into these issues. The types of personal information 
collected by the Octopus card include name, contact details, identification type and number, age and 
date of birth, card number and card usage data. (Octopus, 2010)  Octopus’ personal data policy is very 
loose in defining the terms of how this information can be used. For example it lists, as possible uses of 
the data, actions such as: 
Processing an application for one of our services; the normal management, operation and 
maintenance of the Octopus payment system, including audit; designing new or improving 
existing services provided by Octopus, its subsidiaries and its affiliates (that is, any other 
entity which directly or indirectly controls Octopus, is controlled by Octopus, or is under 
common control with Octopus) for customers' use; marketing of goods and/or services by us, 
Octopus subsidiaries, affiliates or any of Octopus selected business partners. 
Defined in this way there is a wide-ranging remit. Octopus cards can also be linked to the user's credit 
card, which potentially permits another organisation to collect information.9  This wide remit was the 
cause of controversy when in October 2010 Octopus confirmed that it earned about 44 million Hong 
Kong dollars (US$5.7 million) over four-and-a-half years from the sale of personal information with 
six companies for marketing purposes. Until then, the private company denied any such processing 
took place.	
The use of Octopus continues to expand to new services such as in employment, education, small 
financial and personal transactions, and even entering residences.  As this expansion occurs it is 
essential to know what happens with the identifying and transactional information.  That is, if Octopus 
is used for transacting with a third party, what information does that third party get?  Does the shop, 
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employer, school etc. get the name and other information, a unique ID of the card, and/or other 
payment information? 
In the case of Helsinki, the use of travel cards is recorded in a database. This information can be 
accessed to aid transport capacity planning, where the main intention is to aggregate statistics regarding 
the volumes of people on various journeys. Nevertheless, the movements of individual travel card users 
are saved and can be retrieved later for other purposes. For example, the information from the transport 
system has been used for crime investigations in serious cases. Simultaneously, Finnish citizens have 
the right of data protection, in that organisations must protect the information they collect and grant 
individuals right of access to their personal information. Already the Privacy Commissioner of Finland 
has intervened in other transportation data collection systems, and so future development of NFC must 
incorporate privacy as a design feature. 
4.2 The marketplace beyond transport cards 
	
Now that mobile phone manufacturers are mass-producing a wide range of NFC enabled phones, we 
are likely to see the introduction of even more stakeholders and new business models.  Three aspects of 
the marketplace allow us to identify differences in emerging business models.  We identify these as 
regulation, innovation, and privacy. 
Regulation: Institutional influence on stakeholders and technology exist in at least three forms: 
commercial platforms (competition), industry standards (standardisation), and direct regulatory 
intervention (legislation). Taking the domain of NFC for transport as an example, we have seen how 
card technology manufacturers influence usage experiences and data collection methods. Mobile phone 
manufacturers and software vendors also facilitate development of interfaces for NFC usage. 
Technology and business innovation tend to precede the regulator and industry standardisation forums. 
Forum and industry standard activities have been slower to establish commercial critical mass for their 
specifications as they have been focusing on so-called “secure parts” either in phone SIM cards or in 
the hardware of mobile devices.  
Innovation: Proprietary platforms are often developed by one firm which can be radical and disruptive 
to established business models. Industry standardisation efforts are slower and tend to favour 
incremental innovation of current services taking all stakeholders in the forum into account.  The rapid 
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roll-out of some proprietary solutions demonstrates the potential speed of innovation in contrast to the 
effort to establish a widespread industry standard, a process in which each stakeholder vies for 
dominance. New platforms, potentially disruptive compared to existing standards, create choices for 
firms to choose the new technology or wait for emerging consensus around industry standards. In the 
NFC business system, secure part manufacturers have strived towards creating control points around 
their own technology whereas others have developed their NFC platform related to their own operating 
system by themselves, benefitting from lower coordination costs10. 
Privacy control: It is possible to innovate on privacy with the careful handling of a diversity of 
identifiers. Competing models could allow users to choose what information is disclosed and how it is 
used, but no dominant designs have emerged so far. Authentication could be done on devices, the SIM 
card, or in the network. A “secure part” solution is attractive to banks and financial services because it 
appears to be compatible with familiar banking practices. A disruptive player may provide both open 
and closed NFC services, allowing a diverse system with multiple relationships of security to coexist 
(Clark 2011).  It is also possible to enable transactions where no personal information is shared and 
policies and technologies are designed so that no transactional information is generated.  Any claim 
that information is not shared would have to be auditable through technological, expert, and regulatory 
review. 
The case for open devices is supported by the strength of having a set of multiple mobile platform 
access points with potentially one protocol for exchanging communication and a relative simple and 
direct way to enhance and implement levels of security.  Furthermore, the lack of a strong link to bank 
accounts make it accessible by consumers who otherwise would have been excluded from using certain 
services (e.g. no age limit in NFC applications in the Rovio game “Angry Birds”, allowing the 
purchase of units of trade). The case for secure devices, strongly backed by the chip manufacturing 
industry relies on a foundation for the development of customisation by mobile platform and type of 
service, traceable and identifiable links to a unique user identity which will be verified on each 
transaction, and the provision of hardware or software embedded encryption and authentication 
mechanisms. 
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There is a migration from bespoke ticketing technology to “media neutral” payment applications (e.g. 
bank card, mobile payment, credit card). This is partly driven by the desire to embrace the payments 
industry – due to security and privacy issues and regulatory compliance – and not just by the need to 
use bespoke transit solutions.  
In London the identification of problems related to the system is complicated by the lack of 
standardisation, and the lack of a clear driver for expansion, mainly a stronger relationship between 
TfL and associated vendors and operators. The Octopus experience is different, driven by a goal of 
maximum interoperability beyond contactless payments, including open deals with applications and 
services providers, and operators; the number of stakeholders involved has not been a deterrent to the 
expansion of the card (Ma et al., 2008).  
Octopus expansion drivers have carefully kept control over the tussles between the demands of 
consumers and the supply of services, and have successfully managed to provide a good balance 
between the perceived added consumer value: fast passage through gates, ability to buy and top-up 
tickets in advance, to view balances, manage tickets via handset or similar mobile devices, and develop 
Octopus as a main cash replacement. Octopus is also able actively to use its stakeholder status with the 
regulating authority to block the entrance of EMV/credit card providers to compete with a combined 
Octopus and credit card. So there is a conflict of interest when a public authority (MTR/Octopus 
International) is regulating its potential partners; it challenges the basic principles of an efficient 
network market.11.  
Although the future for NFC is drifting towards its use on mobile phones either as embedded software 
and/or hardware, other stakeholders such as newer payment services and even location-based social 
networking services present new competitive business models to deal with NFC, some systems will be 
able to liaise better with the challenges of integration than others. It is still open to discussion how NFC 
will deal with customer’s loyalty or rewards. Some major stakeholders in m-payments seem to have 
taken a cautious approach to NFC; others are taking a more innovative approach by creating some kind 
of loyalty structure that is quite loose and adaptable to the needs of vendors. 
In Japan there is a well-established regime on these type of “exchanges”. For example, Sony’s Edy 
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enables users to cash in loyalty points from contactless tickets (such as Japan Railways (JR) tickets, 
ANA flight tickets and McDonalds coupons) directly into electronic money through an “exchange rate” 
offered by the service provider. Customers can buy JR tickets and get 2% cash back when they buy 
business tickets and 1% cash back on economy tickets. JR compensates Sony and Edy in a separate 
transaction when users cash in their JR loyalty points as electronic cash in convenience stores at tens of 
thousands of service points across Japan.   
We must go further in questioning the role of the institutions that govern how the various profiles are 
managed:  this could be the device manufacturer, the software designer, or some other entity providing 
the back-office operations.  When and how do these institutions combine user information and 
accounts?  Some of the convergence is perhaps necessary for the provision of the additional services, 
but some of it may be ascribed to exploiting technical positions within the architecture to become a 
nerve centre for all these transactions.  Have all the options been considered, including the securing of 
anonymity, or ensuring transactions disclose minimal information? 
Concurrent with the marketing of the first mass-produced NFC enabled mobile phones, two lines of 
thought are emerging from the debate on NFC secure implementation. One of these two lines is to 
increase the security features of NFC into the SIM card.  This is strongly supported by the 
manufacturers of the cards and mobile operators. Their reasoning is that by using this type of hardware 
security, it is easier to comply with regulations and provide a secure service to customers. The other 
line of thought is to have a combination of secure and unsecure elements on NFC, allowing the 
expansion of the system based on relevant “killer” services and applications. One example of this is the 
release of the very popular Angry Birds game with the support of Nokia, where there is no need to use 
the secure element to conduct peer to peer data transactions to provide entertainment to the users of the 
mobile phone.  
In our transport studies, the case of Oyster for London can be considered a closed system where there 
are limited opportunities to provide services within the system; Transport for London has not shown 
any strong interest in developing the Oyster card for acceptance outside its network.  It has devised an 
alternative approach by bringing Visa, and other card provides, into its network. This is driven by the 
need to find external funding to upgrade their IT network. 
In the case of Octopus, from the start of its implementation and due to the mixed composition of the 
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companies providing the services, there has been this drive to have an open market for business 
models, with a low entry demand, allowing small and large merchants to accept the card, providing a 
nurturing environment for the expansion of the card payment system. 
In Japan, Felica Networks started as a joint venture with three revenue streams: mobile operators and 
handset manufacturers, users, and application providers.12 Felica Networks has managed to establish a 
national standard where all mobile operators use the same mobile electronic wallet licensed by Felica 
Networks and interoperable with all other contactless Felica schemes in the country (Sony’s Edy, 
Seven Eleven’s Wanaco, and several others). They operate a “p-mark” privacy certification system 
under the umbrella of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications requiring the registration 
and compliance of any stakeholders dealing with personal information.  
In contrast, Hong Kong’s Octopus is not integrated into any mobile wallets. Sources within MTR also 
recognise the challenges posed by coordinating six mobile operators, numerous mobile phone 
manufacturers and potential other stakeholders around the same table to sort out technical standards 
and commercial agreements.  	
5. The transport case and other business cases for NFC 
In our transport cases, contactless technologies have been implemented amongst others for reasons of 
economic efficiencies, operational efficiency, and user convenience. In Hong Kong and Japan, travel 
cards (Octopus and Suica respectively) have emerged as alternative methods of payments, so-called “e-
money”. In the case of Japan such e-money cards have been integrated into a national standard for 
mobile wallets, accepted by all mobile telecom operators.  
The combination of contactless technologies such as NFC with mobile phones provides the benefit a 
graphic interface from which users can monitor details of their ticket and the remaining balance. In the 
case of Japan Rail (JR), the mobile e-wallet can also be used for complementary services such as “on-
train” purchases of food and beverages and a loyalty card programme. In this case the mobile wallet 
allows for access to specific data on the chip when it has the right keys, i.e. it can access and display 
information regarding the rail ‘card’ but also a payment ‘card’ and loyalty ‘card’. As the scheme is 
																																																																		
12	Further details on the licensing fee can be found in the correspondent appendix on the Tokyo case. 
		 33
accepted in all shops across the country, JR loyalty points could be exchanged for purchases with its 
commercial partners in real-time (such as electronics retailer BicCamera). Japanese airline operator, 
ANA, operates a similar ticketing and loyalty card scheme for air travel.  The contactless token 
economy in Japan took a step forward when McDonald’s introduced a mobile wallet discount coupon 
system in 2011. Multiple NFC cards can be connected to a user’s  mobile phone, enabling a wallet with 
multiple cards. Several of the mobile contactless systems  in Japan allow users to connect a credit card 
for convenient and automatic top-ups and post-payment.  
JR is a listed company and its non-transportation business has grown the past few years, assisted by 
mobile wallet payments, while the growth of its core business, transport, has been flat (Okajima 2008). 
As a leading executive in JR expresses it (Okajima, 2008): “Some day, people would be calling JR East 
an information service company. None of us could even imagine it would happen before the advent of 
Suica.” 
In this case of additional services and accounts being credited with points, this is all being conducted in 
the back-office of the emerging ‘information service’ company.  Vast amounts of information are being 
brought together and managed by a single entity.  This is not much different from how it is currently 
managed today.  Rather, it just introduces new market entrants into that position as single-overseer of a 
large information system.  An important potentiality for NFC and e-wallets is where these transactions 
and the necessary auditing can be conducted on the device.  Such a design could radically reform the 
direction of business models, and would have significant implications for privacy, security, and even 
fraud-prevention. 
The use of NFC outside of public transport is already under development and traditional companies are 
seeking to use their growing information resources to join new markets. However, prior success does 
not mean that we will necessarily see NFC applied in a widespread way into a multi-purpose and multi-
level platform.  Although contactless cards have been successfully implemented for granting access to 
public transport networks in major cities, the high levels of adoption is in part due to lower costs for 
card introduction, a simple membership scheme, an accessible top-up rechargeable format, and a 
relatively simple first application of entry and exit to a transport network.  Within the transport setting 
there are also clear guidelines on data protection and consumer rights.  For instance, individual users 
are city-residents with rights due to the (often) subsidised nature of public transport, or administered by 
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governments that have to respect the rights of citizens.  This also places responsibilities on the service 
providers in that they must shoulder the liabilities of any arising errors or failures.  
Even the public transport case for NFC is facing a significant shift in business cases, and the 
implications for ensuring the effectiveness of its own service remain to be known.  Credit card 
companies and other actors may soon be in positions to manage these NFC services with ease.  We can 
imagine a day when Transport for London will no longer issue Oyster cards.  What are the implications 
for residents, consumers, and citizens if the credit card companies, or other third parties take over 
Oyster’s services? 
As other business models arise to build on the work done by the first-movers in transport, these 
approaches will have to reflect upon the nature of the protections and safeguards for consumers. Some 
particular types of business models might, through the use of NFC, allow the creation of parallel and 
alternative “financial services” using localised facilities or identity/profiling services. If this becomes 
commonplace, what form of governance would apply to this environment? Which regulatory 
framework will be in place to protect consumers and providers of NFC services?  
Table 5a presents a stakeholder comparison among four of the major cities studieed showing relations 
with the transport operator, the trusted service provider, the apparent goals of the trusted service 
provider, and trends on the use and/or implementation of the card system and finally the privacy 
implications of the trend.  
The entities that are the key stakeholders in the potential and new deployments are often very different 
from the early movers in this domain.  They are regulated in very different ways, and have significantly 
different interests and motivations for investing.  This uncertainty over governance is occurring even as 
the levels of personal information and the potentials for using that information for various purposes 
increases dramatically.  The sensitivity of the information is thus growing even as the restrictions that 
were previously understood and deployed are more uncertain and weakening. 
Much of the necessary debate in this domain will be about what qualifies as personal information.13 On 
																																																																		
13	 To	 see	 the	 regulatory	discussion	 on	 this	 in	 Europe,	 see	 the	 conclusions	 of	 the	 committee	 of	
European	 privacy	 commissioners	 in	 the	 Article	 29	 Working	 Party	 Opinion	 4/2007	 ‘On	 the	
Concept	of	Personal	Data’,	June	20,	2007,	available	at	
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the face of it, many may not consider their transactional information ‘personal’, while unique 
identifiers are perhaps more obvious, and personally identifiable information such as subscriber 
information is most obviously ‘personal information’.  In transportation, all of the above information 
can be personal and thus falls under the remit of data protection law.  Transactional information about 
locations can disclose movements even if the user’s name is unknown, and when faced with the 
contactless device identifier it may be possible to reconstruct a profile.  Location, as many mobile 
operating system designers and mobile operators have come to learn, is personal information even if 
the individual's name is not involved.  As we have seen in recent cases, it is often the information that 
people find most worrying when it is collected and disclosed.	
 London Helsinki HK Tokyo 
Transport 
operator 
TFL (Public 
sector) 
Helsinki Transport 
(Public sector) 
MTR 
(Public/Private 
sector) 
JR (Public/Private 
sector) 
Trusted 
contactless 
provider 
TFL Helsinki Transport 
/ Bus operator (as 
going to national 
interoperable/mult
i-card system 
Octopus 
International: 
JV with MTR 
(HK 
government) as 
majority share 
holder 
Felica Networks: 
JV with Sony 
(equipment mfg) as 
main shareholder, 
Telco DoCoMo with 
large minority, JR 
only 5% 
Goals of 
trusted service 
provider 
Public service, not 
for profit 
Public service, not 
for profit 
Commercially 
driven 
Commercially driven 
Trend TFL decreasing 
influence over the 
future of Oyster 
(allowing EMV 
billing). 
Collaboration with 
credit card firms. 
Up to credit card 
firms to integrate 
with mobile and 
possible ‘wallets’. 
National 
interoperability 
with two or three 
cards, no NFC 
commerce at this 
point. 
Expand Octopus 
into mainland 
China. Full on 
competition with 
credit cards. No 
mobile app in 
sight. 
FeliCa commercial 
network, already 
national and full 
mobile integration. 
Expand transaction 
volume in Japan. 
Compete/collaborate 
with credit cards 
(post-paid).  
Privacy 
implications of 
trend 
Diverse set of 
parties and 
jurisdictions may 
yet conflict. 
Contained within 
the transport 
system, and within 
regulations that 
apply to public 
sector. 
Continuous 
challenge from 
commercial 
interests in order 
to compete with 
credit cards 
Regulated by ‘p-
mark’, but there are 
weak regulatory 
frameworks for 
privacy protection in 
Japan. 
Table 5a. Stakeholder comparison for public transport systems using contactless or NFC  
																																																																																																																																																																																												
	http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf	
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In table 5b we show a high order comparison of the contactless elements (in future NFC) for four of the 
cities researched in detail for this study.   
Contactless 
transport scheme 
Oyster Green Card Octopus Suica 
e-payments with 
transport cards 
No plan No plan Deployed Deployed 
contactless loyalty 
and coupon 
system 
None 
implemented 
Under evaluation Variable schemes 
for loyalty and 
bonuses 
Many flavours of 
schemes for both 
loyalty & coupons 
Table 5b: A comparison of  contactless wallet functionality in London, Hong Kong, Helsinki, and 
Tokyo 
Any information that can be linked to an individual is personal.  The definition of personal information 
in the EU Directive on data protection includes "any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person; an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular 
by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, menial, economic, cultural or social identity." 
It is possible to devise mechanisms akin to ‘cash’ or paper coupons where no subscriber or profile 
information is exchanged.  For this to be preserved throughout the chain, personal information cannot 
enter into the transaction upon storage or payment.  If it is possible to later re-identify the individual 
through some means, i.e. linking transactions together to find an identifiable individual, then it was not 
anonymous to begin with, and the full weight of data protection law falls upon the interaction.  
Identifiers have a way of leaking into transactions, particularly those that identify users across multiple 
services.  Preserving anonymity requires great care and probably some advanced cryptography. Failing 
that, when using identifiers they must be directed to a specific purpose, e.g. the administration of a 
coupon to see if it was spent, but not linked to the credit card used to complete the purchase.  This task, 
again, is very difficult to ensure both technologically and from a policy perspective because it governs 
not only the functioning of NFC but also the back-office operations.	
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6. NFC: Control, consent and accountability  
From our understanding of the relationships among stakeholders, the precedents and intentions of 
business models, and the state of policy discussions, we can see that the key determining factor for the 
near future of NFC is the power relations that emerge.  Power in relation to this technology is 
determined by structures of control, practices of consent, and structures of accountability.   
Controls are exercised by stakeholders but, as we have seen, their relationships differ greatly from case 
to case within public transport.  Outside of that realm the differences are even more diverse.  Newly 
emerging stakeholders, especially in the form of mobile telecom operators and other proprietary 
intermediaries, standards setting bodies and user groups seek controlling roles, also.  For instance, 
carriers own the SIM card in phones, not the purchasers of the mechanism.   
Furthermore, the design of the technology is a determining factor, as controls that are built into the 
systems through features of SIM cards differ from those that are built into the main body of mobile 
devices, and further differ from software controls that might be the responsibility of payment systems 
operators (e.g. banks, credit cards, etc.).  Other control points operated by vendors will also emerge. A 
continuing issue will be to determine where those control points are.  As the SIM card is owned by 
mobile network operators and they have the control over the keys to access the secure area of each 
card, where most of the contactless and NFC key data for exchanges are stored. Some other players 
might use ways to bypass the SIM card and offer services without those security features. 
Consent has been dealt with in this report in relation to the “opt in” feature, but we also suggest other 
means to improve on this critical approach to meeting the expectations of users.  We are convinced that 
both successful business models and effective public policy will rest heavily on the resolution of the 
social contract that is embodied in the means of ensuring that users’ privacy is protected and that they 
are satisfied that they have provided clear and limited consent.  The individual must also be able to 
withdraw consent.  Consent must map against what is occurring at all levels in the transactions.  If an 
individual does not understand that location and profile information is being shared across services, 
then this must not be occurring at the level of the identifiers or at a policy level across the organisations 
involved in the transactions.  This means that all organisations throughout the transaction are 
accountable to following the rules of processing authorised by the act of consent. 
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The liabilities that are distributed throughout the systems in which NFC are used may be the most 
critical feature of the short-term growth of this technology.  Who bears the risks, both for monetary 
losses and for breaches of privacy and data security, will be factored in to each decision process.  
Which bodies are liable to be sued and how losses might be distributed will be a critical feature.  Some 
of this will be determined by courts and legislatures, but too vague a notion of liability is likely to be 
expressed as reluctance to fund on the part of investors.   
Here we can take the stakeholder analysis further while describing the relationships among 
stakeholders and how their multiple and interrelated interests create severe competition problems.  The 
clash of business models, with architectures that allow various third parties to make use of transactional 
information conducted by others is likely to result in conflict.  That is, previously it was simple;  there 
was a single transport system that was interacting with a single payment service.  Now there are 
telecommunication networks, mobile companies, operating system developers, financial services 
companies, and even application developers who expect to benefit from information about transactions.  
Who makes decisions about control, consent and accountability within this fragmented and conflicted 
domain? 
At the outset of the report we introduced our triangular focus of themes affecting business models for 
NFC: technology, regulation, and privacy. In this section we will merge these themes with how 
stakeholders are jockeying for position by deploying various expressions for power: control, 
accountability, and consent. 
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Privacy 
Regulation
self‐regulating firms
industry standards
legislation
Technology
Business Model 
Opportunities
AccountabilityConsent
Control
 
Figure 6: Interactions between the elements of the model showing consent, control and accountability 
 
There are at least three kinds of groups responsible for making these decisions:  companies that are 
investing in NFC (those making strategic business choices), regulators and policy makers who must 
make decisions about the extent to which these scenarios are acceptable, and consumers themselves 
who may become more empowered through the diversity of choices.  It is not so simple as to assume 
that these groups have absolute freedom over how to make these decisions.  Companies individually 
have varying abilities to make influential decisions based on what roles they play and the extent of their 
market reach.  A mobile network provider has very different capabilities from an operating system 
developer or the transport provider.  Similarly, regulators and policy makers are restricted by their 
remits and jurisdictions, and even with the timing of their interventions.  Finally, consumers have been 
affected by pricing pressures such as reduced prices for using NFC over paper or other tickets. 
The pressure points for all these decisions are set around who has control, what are the consent 
regimes, and where liabilities lie.  In turn, the potential efficacy of different business strategies when 
providing consumers with new services will rest upon these. The introduction of new services with 
their combination of NFC technology and personal identifiers raises questions as to who has control, 
who gives consent, and what the status of that consent is. It also holds implications for who holds 
liability. Following on from these larger questions are the design details:  how and what information is 
stored and transmitted, which information is collected, and how is it processed? 
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If identity management can be done successfully, NFC can achieve what many other technologies have 
failed to do:  enhancing privacy and security while also supporting improved use of resources, 
overcoming barriers to growth and fostering innovation, facilitating global services and improving user 
convenience.   
Spoilers may try to take advantage of consumer behaviour knowledge to induce consumers to give 
away their privacy in exchange for services and goods. This notion of “giving away” personal 
information is a fallacy, however, as individuals always retain their privacy rights even after a 
transaction has taken place.  Yet advocates of the idea of allowing NFC to develop a strong structure 
for business models without overt consideration of data protection and further regulation defend this 
position by expressing their concern that too much regulation might severely limit its development. As 
discussed above, this is a common argument in technology policy that often conceals competitive 
elements: some business models are preserved and others are hampered through regulation.  
Regardless, the rise of consumer concern over privacy combined with the great potentials for 
empowering consumers through the use of advanced techniques places a burden upon companies and 
technologists to design their systems to consider privacy from the outset.  Just as the deployment of 
RFID in Europe requires consideration of the impact upon privacy through privacy impact assessments, 
NFC business models and technological designs need to consider how their choices implicate privacy. 	
7. Determining relationships 
 
7.1 Structure of interactions 
Contactless card schemes, such as Oyster, Green Card, Octopus, and Suica, could be seen as rule-
making governance mechanisms with various remits from respective regulators to control flows of user 
data. Users could be under the impression they are involved in fees-only transactions when in reality 
they are also disclosing user data. In some cases (such as Oyster PAYG) the user does not have to 
disclose identity information and may choose to not share any user data with the contactless card 
operator. However, in most cases involving value added services such as subscriptions (travel cards), 
currency exchanges (loyalty cards), or post-payments (credit cards) the identity of the user will be 
verified by operators before an offer can be made. Particularly in cases of tailored offers, prior 
knowledge of user preferences or user profiles are almost always needed. 	
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One way of looking at it is that the duration of interaction between users and operators therefore varies 
between one-shot transactions (anonymous, and contingent renewals. The structure of interactions 
between NFC providers and users could therefore be described in terms of relational contracts with 
different grades of completeness (Brown et al. 2004). Complete contracts are possible in situations 
where a precise specification of the trade could be described in volume, grade, and delivery terms. 
Incomplete contracting induces a more intensive contact between buyer and seller focusing on quality. 
Business model opportunities can in part be seen as structured by the characteristics of such 
interactions between NFC operators and users.  
Another way of approaching the problem is that through minimal disclosure and directed identifiers, 
walls may be built up so that an individual can enjoy privacy-preserving multi-purpose and cross-
boundary interactions, even repeatedly.  Much of it comes down to the design of the system, and the 
subsequent regulations.  These might not necessarily be of a legal nature but if privacy-preserving 
practices are to become a norm then there needs to be some mechanisms to audit compliance. 
The table below generalises contentious situations regarding consent and accountability when users are 
under the impression they enter a complete contract, but may in reality enter an incomplete contract 
due to lack of control over their user data:  
Structure of 
interactions 
Complete 
contracts 
Incomplete 
contracts 
Contentious issues with consent and 
accountability with regards to user data	
Traders’	
relationships	
Anonymous	 Trust;	
retaliation	for	
cheating 
Users will be gravitate towards complete 
contracts if they don’t trust the NFC 
operator with their data 
Offers Public Private Users could give consent to a transaction 
without being aware of what user data is 
collected (and traded yet again) and 
accounted for by the NFC operator  
Duration One shot Contingent 
renewal 
Users pay for a service or product, but 
can’t be sure for how long their data will 
be kept or who is liable for disposing of it 
Table 7. NFC schemes and relational contracts: Adapted from Brown et al. (2004) and Bowles (2004) 
 
7.2 Privacy threats to stakeholders 
Privacy respect does not end with mere legal compliance. Rather, NFC systems designers must address 
how abuse is limited, how consent and control of the user are implemented into the NFC, disclosure is 
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minimised, and how only relevant parties are granted access to the information, while also considering 
how individuals are interacting with the system.  The ‘laws of identity’ developed by Kim 
Cameron14http://www.identityblog.com/?p=354 provide a useful framework for analysing how 
these decisions may be designed into technologies and services.  Cameron’s identity framework builds 
from a similar origin to NFC and public transport, in that identity used to be the preserve of few 
players, often monopoly services, which in most cases are government.  The changing business 
environment meant that more stakeholders were getting involved, and the ‘laws of identity’ establishes 
some of the basic rules these participants must consider in order to protect the individual. Rather than 
establishing a single ideal technique, the laws of identity are an understanding of the ‘metasystem’ that 
provides many of the benefits sought after by each stakeholder while protecting the rights of the 
individual citizen and consumer.  An example of this ‘meta-system’ is an NFC enabled wallet with a 
number of cards, or even a wallet of wallets. 
Services using NFC capability on a device having a collective user interface (or access) to the various 
services on the secure element – a so called ‘wallet’ may then be assessed under these rules with 
regards to the protection of privacy.  First, a service gathered under a ‘wallet’ must only reveal personal 
information with the consent of the individual, and so we must consider how the individual’s approval 
is sought.  Any information must then be disclosed for limited uses, and this hinges on how the uses are 
communicated to the individual.  Then this approach would verify that information must be disclosed 
only to the fewest parties, e.g. the wallet must manage identifiers in ways that even the wallet provider 
itself may only collect transactional information, and that only if it is necessary.  Following on from 
this, information that is disclosed should be directed at that service, e.g. the credit payment transaction 
involves a credit card number, the loyalty scheme has a separate unique identifier, the transport 
network receives another separate identifier, and there is no need unnecessarily to share identifiers 
without the individual’s consent.  Ultimately, the integrity of the entire wallet relies on the technology 
being able to do these things.  It must sustain directed identifiers, it must accommodate multiple 
stakeholders securing the transactions from the technology to the individual user through directed 
transactions, it should ensure limited disclosures for limited uses, and it should promote user awareness 
and involvement. 
																																																																		
14	http://www.identityblog.com/?p=354	
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7.3 Design 
Among the design decisions for NFC are those related to data characteristics, security, transmission 
protocols and usage settings, and all of these have privacy implications.  Basic design of data capacity 
and formatting can be deliberate in accommodating certain kinds of data mining practices.  Security 
design choices include capabilities for trusted versus non-trusted functionalities. Protocols designed in 
address various forms of calibration that affect, among other things, speed and proximity capabilities.   
Finally usage settings determine how the mechanism might be used as a reader, a writer, or both a 
reader-writer. 
Design decisions for secure elements currently commonly proceeds without reference to the power 
relations as expressed by control, consent and accountability.  Better practices will only emerge after 
procedures are in place to accommodate the input from the analysis of user experiences with regard to 
privacy.  The resulting design improvements will both increase the likelihood of success in 
commercialisation and the acceptability of NFC to users. 
In terms of NFC the role of the trusted service managers is important. Mastercard has been running a 
scheme with Gemalto for this role. Similarly, Ericsson has enabled the same strategy with mobile 
operators. Gemalto has defined their role very narrowly, based on GSMA guidelines=. The 
specification for the role was defined in 2009 by the Global Platform White Paper (Global Platform, 
2009) which presented some workable recommendations of designs in relation to trusted services 
managers. 
7.4 Analyzing privacy 
Although NFC is not a traditional type of innovation, we see a concensus emerging on ways to tackle 
privacy concerns.  Consideration of privacy at the design of the technologies and services is necessary 
in order to avoid potential regulatory pitfalls.  Investments in NFC may be poorly-placed unless a 
regulatory backlash is considered within the risk mitigation strategies at the earliest stages. There are 
analogies with internet business models that have provoked regulators many years after heavy 
investments were made. 
For specialists, analysing shifting market and institutional relationships and seeing how technology is 
affecting the use of information is a common practice. However, this approach may miss the detailed 
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legal issues that are enabling or preventing changes in relationships, and treat the technology merely as 
an object being developed to respond to market dynamics. 
Most manufacturers of NFC chips, along with the NFC Forum, have tried to describe privacy as 
primarily a technical issue and they merely monitor the protocols and the transfer methods. This is a 
preferred path leaving the issues of security to the telecom operators, regulators and users.  Issues such 
as security could be well covered in this approach, but a latent risk of this approach is to ignore legal 
issues, as well as some key actors, even the users, and considerations such as individual attitudes and 
social norms. 
The other set of specialists is primarily concerned with the legal aspect of NFC. For them to take a 
legal approach is to establish a preferred framework for regulation, but at the moment there is no law 
that considers NFC, and it may be years before relevant regulatory guidance emerges.  When 
regulations do emerge, early entrants into this market may be punished for not adequately considering 
privacy and security.  Alternatively, the regulation may emerge too late to have any significant impact 
on the technology practices and services. 
Analysing privacy requires us to heed technological and legal changes, monitor information flows and 
all the implicated institutional actors.  Importantly, however, our proposed analytical approach lets us 
include the individual, whether regarded as a citizen, consumer, or data subject.  Including the 
individual is not necessarily a novel approach.  Marketing research and human-computer interaction 
researchers have long considered the individual and/or the user and adoption dynamics.  Within a 
privacy research approach, however, the user is an individual who is legally protected as a citizen and a 
consumer. 
It is useful to differentiate between the individual’s intended actions and their actual behaviour induced 
under certain conditions. Legal protection may not always be adequate to prevent the infringement of 
the user’s privacy. Many perfectly legal agreements are digitally signed and entered into without being 
viewed or understood. In the established arena of the web and physical (“High Street”) purchases of 
goods and services, this is subject to widespread scrutiny – in the case of the web, from user and 
consumer groups who very rapidly highlight and condemn poor quality or sharp practices, and in the 
case of the mainstream physical market, a large section of the media is dedicated to “watchdog” actions 
on consumer rights. However, where NFC is concerned, few such safeguards exist and it is difficult to 
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investigate malpractice. It would be relatively easy for NFC providers and partners to follow the law, 
strongly steer consumers towards certain behaviours in ways that could be considered sharp practice, 
and escape widespread censure.  
This lack of “soft” protection has a few analogies in the current marketplace. Firstly, some banks 
impose high charges on account holders and although this is legal it is poorly understood by the 
consumer. Secondly, a householder is in theory free to switch between competing utility companies, 
but the way in which energy costs are calculated can be opaque. Thirdly, some airlines and rail 
companies exploit legal loopholes to make it difficult to claim refunds for delays. These examples do 
not concern privacy, but do serve to illustrate how legal protection does not always adequately protect 
consumer rights. In the case of NFC privacy, a potentially long history of personal data and 
transactions, which the consumer may only dimly recall, could be even more easily exploited. Any 
privacy analysis should include a section analysing the practical implications of NFC providers’ 
privacy policies, bearing in mind that they will almost certainly comply with the letter of the law, yet 
may discretely circumvent its spirit and purpose. 
Even more traditional privacy analyses need to be updated to consider the relationships among 
institutions.  One of the leading techniques for analysing privacy in a setting is a privacy audit.  A 
privacy audit is applied traditionally to organisations that have specific and well-established legal 
requirements, and in turn, the privacy audit will ascertain whether information in that organisation is 
processed in accordance with the law.  It is very much a test of compliance within an organisational 
setting.  It is therefore inappropriate for applying to a context where the legal regime is not yet explicit 
about an innovation and when the innovation itself is in a formative stage. 
Many privacy experts recommend applying a recent, structured technique for assessing privacy within 
such unstructured environments: the privacy impact assessment (PIA).  These are emerging as a best 
practice in many countries and settings, and are required by law in others (e.g. the U.S. Federal 
Government has required PIAs for all new government systems since the E-Government Act of 2002). 
This will allow experts to understand better how the system was designed to consider privacy through 
minimal processing of information, where the control is been excised, how this control can be with the 
well understood implications, and how consent is managed and adhered to.  It can also define for many 
possible cases guidance rules for dealing with accountability and tussles that will emerge from the NFC 
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business models.  
PIAs are not easy.  They take time and other resources.  They require expertise and attention.  They 
require coordination across federated services.  Just as app stores have found problems in ensuring that 
all applications have privacy policies, it will be difficult to ensure that every stakeholder in a process 
has considered privacy and is accountable with regards to privacy law.  Regulators will likely reach for 
PIAs as a first resort, as it has been applied already to RFID technologies.  This may cause much delay 
and consternation in the deployment of NFC. 
The alternative is to design privacy into the use of NFC right down to how the identifiers are managed.  
Business models will have to consider privacy in the way they approach the processing of personal 
information.  If done properly, NFC will spur new forms of innovation.  If not, it could be stunted.	
8. Conclusions 
This white paper has focused on NFC as a technology that has reached maturity for adoption. We 
investigated contactless technologies and their use as a faster and more efficient metropolitan ticketing 
system, through the current development plans to be integrated in mobile phones, to its expansion to 
provide many other services (e.g. other forms of ticketing, micro payments, loyalty schemes, etc). All 
these developments have significant implications for consumers and societal behaviour.  
For the cases studies the comparison among transport systems demonstrates varieties of 
implementation in technology and business models. All these various systems can coexist, but given 
the infringements of rights that some elements of the expansion of systems threaten, new regulatory 
practices are going to be demanded.  In April 2011 the EU decided to encourage self-regulation for the 
near future expansion of NFC. The overall goal is to allow a period for free competition and quick 
development of economically sustainable business models using the technology. This is consistent with 
our own conclusions, which focus on the development of business models and the protection of the 
rights of consumers.   
The current approach to choosing between “opt in” and “opt out” is inadequate for NFC applications. 
Although consent is an important part of the perception of having control of one’s privacy, users cannot 
adequately asses how effective and at what point the individual knows when there is a default opt in or 
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opt out. Rather, using Kim Cameron’s ‘laws of identity’ approach, developers and businesses could, at 
the outset, consider how they involve the individual in each transaction and to what extent personal 
information is implicated.  NFC and its use on various platforms, most notably mobile phones, has 
great potential for involving and informing the user in ways that is currently impossible with the simple 
NFC-as-a-card implementation.  It is therefore necessary to devise ways to inform users about the 
manner in which their information is used that is clear and unobtrusive, and in turn to ensure that 
information is only processed accordingly.  
We foresee that are ways to overcome the limitations of this consumer control problem to 
accommodate other stakeholders of the NFC business environment. An effective measure will be to 
create mechanisms for quick assessment for each new service that is provided for NFC in regards of the 
practical aspects of implementation e.g. data retention, location, and distribution. This can be used as a 
“fact sheet” by industry and regulators to provide a comprehensive understanding to consumers.  This 
sort of “fact sheet” might be analogous to the way McDonalds provides a calorie count to people 
buying meals. 
Information that is recorded and stored by different NFC stakeholders ought to be bounded by a 
contractual obligation of a “last use by date for data”. Certain NFC services require storing data for 
shorter periods of time than others, or they might not require stored data at all. By establishing a 
maximum time for storage of data that is economically sustainable within the business model there will 
likely be benefits in reducing potential fraud and violations of the privacy rights of consumers.  This 
must not only be done in the form of a policy principle.  Rather, auditable statements must be provided, 
backed up by technological design, with serious penalties applied for failing to adhere to their claims. 
Many consumer concerns have not yet been addressed by the current providers of NFC services. Clear 
guidelines need to be provided about the procedures for registering complaints and for rectifying 
violations. This outlook will be more complicated when mobile based e-wallets become popular 
features, when more people make use of multiple authentication features and when there is access to a 
large number of different kinds of funding sources (e.g. credit cards, banks, etc.).  
Our comparative research also shows the value of clarifying accountability terms for NFC use. Much 
of the attention paid to accountability is focused on the determination of the limits for transactions.  In 
contrast, too little serious debate is in evidence about cases of fraud or unlawful use of personal 
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information by others. Clarifying and embedding preventive measures for accountability will have a 
strong positive effect upon the development of business models. Unless properly designed and 
deployed, NFC could very well make matters worse in this regard.   
The governance of the NFC system is constituted of multiple stakeholders, some of them obtaining 
significant control over the potential market of NFC services and applications. Coherence and 
consistency are required as users become familiar with new ways of deploying NFC.  If one NFC 
interaction varies significantly from another, while hiding the levels of protections and invasiveness, 
then the entire system is poorly served and the technology can become maligned much as RFID was.  
Greater cooperation is required amongst stakeholders to resolve practices for interfaces, minimise legal 
ambiguities, and to come to agreement on best practices in the issuance and validation of cards.  While 
the industry pays considerable attention to this at hardware and software levels they have not taken into 
account the business significance of it in relation to how to handle the multiple identities and models of 
services. This recommendation does not affect current systems in place to deal with the validation of 
transactions. It is highly likely that someone will at some time soon have to be responsible for deciding 
which third parties can or cannot participate in the NFC system by issuing and validating ‘cards’. 
To conclude, it is not so simple as to say that NFC is inevitable because of its widespread use.  Nor is it 
inevitably going to expand because key market players have decided to include the technology within 
their devices and services.  But as we have seen with transport, the potential for NFC is immense and 
may yet challenge some of the well-established market participants and provide new and fertile 
grounds for business and trade.  NFC, if deployed well, like many innovations, has much to offer.  
However, the risks to personal privacy must be addressed.  This is not only to protect against 
surveillance, but it is essential to ensure that there is confidence in the marketplaces that may yet 
emerge with widespread use of NFC.   
The key danger is that the discussion of privacy in this domain will degenerate into debates over 
‘regulation’ vs. ‘innovation’, as we have seen in so many other technology policy debates.  For NFC to 
thrive, privacy must be considered in the design of the technology, the platforms, and the services.  The 
key questions raised throughout this report must be answerable by all stakeholders in the emerging 
system:  how are you informing and involving citizens and consumers, protecting their information 
from unnecessary collection and use, and ensuring that any arising risks are mitigated?  One day the 
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law will catch up, and regulators wonder what their roles are and, though it may be overly optimistic, 
we can hope that there will be very little for them to do. Not because NFC failed to live up to its 
potential, but because the positive opportunities for transforming markets and the ways that we engage 
with citizens and consumers have been harnessed to the benefit of all. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 – London  
The UK Context 
In the UK the partial privatisation of public transport has created difficult conditions for the 
implementation of a standard collection system. The communications regulator, OFCOM, describes the 
need to further integrate ticketing in order to reduce travelling times15. The case of London has always 
been exceptional due to the very large number of trips generated in the city, which makes the 
implementation of any new ticketing systems a major stakeholder in the whole of the UK transport 
market. Around 70% of all National Rail journeys begin or end in London, and the revenue from fares 
for Transport for London alone was £2.5 billion in 2009.   
In 2009 the Department for Transport decided to provide £20m in funding over the following five years 
to enable nine of England's largest urban areas to make the switch to NFC-compatible transport 
ticketing systems. There is an overall goal to implement NFC in the entire London network before the 
Olympics in 2012. Also in 2012, Transport for London launches “touch and go” bus payments with 
NFC enabled credit and debit cards. Part of the reason is the influx of foreign nationals for the 
Olympics and it would save the transport authorities costs if they can limit the issuance of travel cards. 
It is therefore technically an incremental step rather than a major leap to embed such credit cards chips 
in phones, similar to Felica payments in Japan. As Transport for London is moving towards phasing 
out its Oyster system, they indicate that initiatives for mobile ticket payments are more likely to come 
from mobile handset makers and financial institutions than from themselves. If the UK succeeds with 
such mobile NFC payments in the transport system, it will be approximately 10 years after it was 
introduced in Japan. 
The Oyster card 
London Underground implemented its first travel card in 1983. By 1989 this card was integrated with 
the national rail-ticketing network. A major change in the administration of ticketing revenue took 
																																																																		
15	 	Based on a report written by Methley in 2008 
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place in 1998 when the Prestige company was awarded the contract for ticketing services and a process 
to roll out the creation of a faster, revenue-driven ticketing system began. After a number of years in 
the pipeline, the Oyster card was launched in 2003. This was presented as a bespoke solution able to 
deal with the problems of scale on the London Transport network. Underground revenue lost due to 
irregular ticket travel have subsequently fallen from about 4% in 2002 (before the launch of Oyster) to 
less than 1.5% by the end of 200716. 
The Oyster card is an RFID smart card used for electronic ticketing. Oyster is simple: one purchases 
the card, tops up with cash either at terminals or online, then swipes the card at a reader when taking a 
train or bus trip. Ticket costs and concessions are automatically deducted. The Oyster card makes 
ticketing much more efficient for the consumer: no paper tickets, no handover of cash, little or no 
interaction with ticketing staff, and speedier processing when entering the train station or bus. For the 
transport authorities, there are cost savings and operators suffer far fewer instances of ticket payment 
avoidance or counterfeit tickets. The original Oyster card was a subscription only card, which reduced 
the costs of travelling in some cases by 50%. In 2004 the Oyster “pay as you go” (PAYG) option was 
launched, and between 2007 and 2010 the Oyster card PAYG service was extended to national rail 
services within London’s transport zones. In 2007 a trial of NFC for mobile transport ticketing was 
carried out in London involving 500 customers, the largest such trial up to that time17. 
Future plans to implement bankcard or credit card and mobile application acceptance are planned 
across the TfL services for the 2012-2015 period. However, these have been delayed due to technical 
glitches that are still not satisfactorily solved from the point of view of TfL, involving especially 
transaction speeds, which are expected to be less than half a second for a smooth passage of the 
transaction. 
According to figures sourced by TfL (Lewis, 2010) there are 12 million active cards in use, with the 
number of people travelling daily on the London Transport network estimated at 3 million.  Every 
weekday in London, 6.3 million journeys are made on London’s buses, 3.5 million on the Tube and by 
rail, and 0.2 million on trams, light rail and river boats; of those 80% are using Oyster.  
																																																																		
16  http://www.ltmuseum.co.uk/assets/downloads/London_Transport_-_April_2009_A4.pdf	
17  http://www.nfc-forum.org/resources/white_papers/NFC_in_Public_Transport.pdf	
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Figure A1: The use case for London Transport NFC in buses  
The Oyster card has been considered a success, given the 12 million active cards. At the start of their 
implementation a number of problems appeared, due to malfunctioning of the technology or human 
errors. Further studies are now focusing on how users’ behaviour might be affected by the use of 
devices where the initiation and acknowledgement of a transaction is passive rather than active.  
The adoption was slow and not free of trouble. Users have been incorrectly charged due to software 
problems; the card was also hacked shortly after its official release. There have been complaints about 
abuse of requests for information about individuals’ travel patterns. The numbers of requests from the 
Metropolitan Police to London Transport have been constantly increasing since 2007. The Met made 
6,576 requests in 2010 and was turned down 810 times. One major drawback is that the individual user 
from where the data is sourced is not informed of a police search request until a prosecution occurs. 
Overcharging is a continuous issue that has become worse since the first figures on complaints were 
published in 2008. In 2010 there were around 190,000 complaints involving a record £60 million of 
claims. 
Appendix 2 – Hong Kong  
Mainland China and Hong Kong 
Although control of Hong Kong was handed back to the People’s Republic of China in 1997 after 
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almost a century of British rule, significant differences remain in how public transport communications 
are regulated between Hong Kong and Mainland China.  Despite these persistent inconsistencies, the 
Chinese government has an overall goal to standardise future regulation whilst keeping the most 
valuable aspects of the regulation inherited from the British system and furthering the role of Hong 
Kong in developing the Chinese economy.  Hong Kong is administered through a special government 
regime that allows a more visible type of government.  That has direct influence on the use of personal 
information in Hong Kong as it is governed by the legacy Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance of 1996, 
and regulated by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner.18	
The Octopus Card 
Hong Kong started the Octopus Card as a public transport pass in 1997. A limited-purpose stored value 
card was issued by Creative Star Limited (CSL), a company jointly owned by transport operators, 
primarily for payment of transport services provided by them in their role as core users. The card 
scheme was launched in the third quarter of 1997, when it was exempted from the restrictive definition 
of multipurpose stored value cards under the government’s Banking Ordinance.  This was done in 
recognition of what was intended as a restricted range of services and because the risk of its use to the 
payment system and cardholders was considered slight. Subsequently, apart from the core use, the card 
could also be used to pay for goods and services provided by shops and kiosks within the station 
premises (“non-core use”); these kinds of uses were regarded as ancillary or incidental uses and were 
limited to 15% of the value of all transactions carried out with the card. In April 2000, CSL was 
authorised as a special purpose deposit-taking company to issue Octopus cards under the Banking 
Ordinance. The authorisation of CSL allows Octopus cards to be used for a wider range of transactions, 
including some that are non-transport related, with a view to enhancing the convenience for 
																																																																		
18	EMV vs. NFC payments: Hong Kong, Japan and beyond:  In Hong Kong and Japan, NFC-enabled electronic 
money is challenging the credit card companies for smaller transactions involved in shopping and ticketing. In 
Hong Kong the Octopus scheme has so far been separate from EMV cards not allowing Octopus functionality on 
any credit cards. Octopus cards have become an alternative payment and salary method for migrant workers from 
Mainland China.  Japan saw its NFC rollout competing with credit cards through lower transaction fees. However, 
in Japan post-paid NFC cards are offered with credit card payments under schemes offered by mobile operator 
NTT DoCoMo, and credit card companies JCB and VISA. Such post-paid NFC schemes boasted more than 20 
million users in March 2010. The recent expansion and some 750,000 transactions registered up until May 2010.  
 Octopus has made inways in Mainland China through its introduction in Shenzhen and other regions. 
The nature of Octopus as a commercial and international standard as a clearinghouse gives its parent companies 
incentives to expand further.  The fact that China is a laggard in credit card utilisation makes it likely that conflicts 
might occur between stakeholders. Keeping in mind that Octopus is built on proprietary technology from a foreign 
equipment manufacturer could arouse interest in Mainland China for developing their own proprietary technology. 
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cardholders. Accordingly, the ceiling on non-core use was raised from 15% to 50% of the aggregate 
value of transactions. However, the card continues to be officially regarded as mainly transport-related 
(BIS, 2001). Over time the Octopus card has had different periods of expansion and development, as 
summarized in table A2. 
Time Events 
1992-1997 The MTR Corporation Limited takes the lead in reviewing automatic fare collection. 
Five major public transport operators established a join venture to oversee contactless 
smartcard systems development and implementation 
1997 Octopus smartcard system launched with full integration on travel across public 
transport systems in Hong Kong 
2000 Octopus wanting to develop the card vast commercial potential, applied and obtained a 
Special Purpose taking Company authorisation from the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority19 to expand its use to a wider base of different applications 
2001 Octopus stakeholders sign a change on the company status from non-profit making to 
profit making 
2003 Octopus wins its first overseas contract to supply its Clearing House System for the 
national contactless smartcard scheme in the Netherlands 
2005 Introduction of a common brand with loyalty programs over the transport and 
commerce networks 
2006 Octopus extends its acceptability to main land China – Shenzen region, and Automatic 
Add Value Service extended 
2007 Octopus wins a contract to develop and implement a contactless smartcard payment in 
Dubai 
2008 Octopus launches is co-brand credit card with Citibank. A credit card with the Octopus 
function. 
2010 Mayor security scandal due to the Octopus company selling consumers data to third 
parties. New regulatory demands to be put in place on Octopus 
2011 Progress in enabling multiple modes of Octopus interfaces, expansion to other service 
areas 
Table A2: Octopus timeline - Sourced from Octopus Holdings Ltd report online 
Figure A2 showed the use case for the Hong Kong demonstrates how banking services are integrated in 
the value proposition for ticketing. 
																																																																		
19 http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/ 
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Figure A2. Octopus NFC 
The Octopus card has the support of Hong Kong’s five major transportation companies. Although some 
of these companies compete directly for riders, the saving they achieved by implementing a shared 
smart card system appear to have outweighed any competition concerns (Clark, 2005). There has been 
a lot of cooperation in establishing an equitable, or even an acceptable distribution of profits. 
Besides these advantages, the RFID technology for Octopus has been embodied in a variety of forms, 
including key chains, mobile phones and watches. Additionally Octopus has offered incentives in 
savings, and its acceptance over the whole transport network makes its use attractive to consumers 
(Chan and Foster, 2009). 
Octopus was also free of narrowly technology-related problems in the early stages of adoption. Very 
few failures of the Octopus card were reported. In Cantonese, Octopus has a second name that 
translates as “goes everywhere”, a name that is very descriptive of the uses of the card that has, to a 
great extent, replaced cash in Hong Kong. Octopus cards can also be used as an electronic form of 
identification. Many Hong Kong workers clock-in and out of job sites with the same card they use to 
get there. Instead of using keypads or key fobs for access control, businesses authorise the Octopus 
card most residents already carry to unlock doors. Schools use Octopus for roll call, buying food, 
checking out library books and making school payments (Chan and Foster, 2009). 
This type of use leverages the existing successful micro-e-money payment system for other forms of 
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payment, such as Hong Kong employee travel and entertainment cards, and corporate purchase cards 
for small purchases, which are normally paid through petty cash. Some personalized Octopus smart 
cards are used to remit small sums of money to destinations with the help of a remittance system such 
as Western Union, but there has not yet been any impact on regulatory and licensing requirements for 
such a transaction (Ma et al., 2008). This of course has implications in relation to Hong Kong and 
China laws on internal migration. 
There have been several major leaks of data that have been widely publicised in the international 
media. The most serious one was a sale by the Octopus operator of information relevant to consumers 
that fell foul of the Hong Kong privacy laws. According to the existing Privacy Ordinance, it is against 
the law to use personal data for direct marketing unless the individual has been informed.  Octopus 
confirmed in October 2010 that it earned about 44 million Hong Kong dollars (US$5.7 million) over 
four-and-a-half years from the sharing of personal information with six companies for marketing 
purposes. Until then, the private company denied any such sale took place. 
Appendix 3 –Helsinki  
The Finnish Context 
Finland	has	a	history	of	early	trials	and	implementations	of	wireless	technologies.	Helsinki	City	
Transport	(HKL)	has	offered	an	SMS‐based	mobile	ticketing	service	since	2001	and	the	presence	
of	Nokia	has	ensured	early	trials	of	NFC.	NFC	could	be	seen	as	an	element	of	so‐called	intelligent	
transportation	 systems	 (ITS),	which	 is	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 national	 traffic	 and	 even	 export	 policy.	
Public	transport	makes	up	15%	of	total	personal	traffic	in	Finland.	
Helsinki,	Espoo	and	several	other	towns	have	an	integrated	ticket	system20.	The	same	NFC	ticket,	
called	 “The	Green	Card”,	 can	be	used	 for	 travelling	 on	buses,	 trams,	 the	metro,	 and	 commuter	
trains,	 operated	 by	 Helsinki	 City.	 Finland	 HKL’s	 turnover	 will	 reach	 approximately	 EUR	 140	
million	in	2010,	which	amounts	to	less	than	5%	of	Oyster	revenues	in	London.		
“Matkahuolto21”	is	a	holding	company	controlled	by	private	bus	companies	in	Finland,	and	they	
																																																																		
20 http://www.hsl.fi/EN/ticketsandfares/Pages/default.aspx  
21 http://www.matkahuolto.fi/en/	
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operate	 a	 smart	 card	 not	 compatible	 to	 the	 Green	 Card.	 The	 Ministry	 of	 Transport	 and	
Communications	work	on	a	harmonisation	scheme	 in	order	 to	enable	 interoperability	of	 travel	
cards	 across	 Finland.	 Guidelines	 by	 the	ministry	 of	 transport	 in	 their	 latest	 2008	plan	 include	
amongst	others	the	following22:	
 The	national	government	part‐fund	the	city	public	transport	if	this	contributes	towards	
increased	 utilisation	 of	 public	 transport,	 it	 increases	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 public	
transport,	and	the	cities	themselves	increase	their	investments.	
 The	 national	 government	 should	 increase	 access	 to	 public	 transport	 and	 increase	
conditions	for	pedestrians	and	cyclists	
 Ease	 of	 use	 for	 using	 public	 transport	 and	 ticketing	 should	 increase	 while	 public	
procurement	of	regional	transport	should	improve	
	
Even	though	a	small	market,	implications	of	Finnish	technology	and	policy	have	an	impact	on	the	
European	debate	on	privacy.	Finnish	technology	providers	also	have	influence	beyond	their	size	
in	the	international	markets.	
The Green Card  
Helsinki	travel	cards	are	contactless	integrated	circuit	cards	or	proximity	cards	that	are	based	on	
the	ISO	14443A	standard	with	a	reading	distance	of	1	to	8	cm23.	They	replaced	paper	tickets	in	
the	area's	public	transport	system	by	the	end	of	2002.	The	price	of	a	ticket	depends	on	whether	
passengers	travel	within	one	municipality	or	between	municipalities,	as	well	as	on	the	type	of	the	
ticket	and	how	and	where	 it	 is	purchased.	 	One	can	choose	the	 length	of	 the	period	from	14	to	
366	days.	The	longer	uninterrupted	period	is	chosen,	the	more	economical	is	the	travelling.	The	
amount	of	 value	 loaded	 into	 the	 card	 can	be	between	5	 and	400	euros.	The	 same	 card	 can	be	
loaded	with	both	a	period	ticket	and	top‐up	for	individual	travel.		
Mobile	ticketing	is	widespread,	especially	with	the	popularity	of	SMS	travel	tickets,	which	make	
up	one	fifth	of	all	 tickets	and	a	third	of	tram	tickets	sold.	The	user	can	purchase	a	single	ticket	
																																																																		
22  http://www.lvm.fi/c/document_library/get_file?folderId=57092&name=DLFE-
3102.pdf&title=LVM 31/2008 
23  http://www.hsl.fi/FI/matkustajanopas/faq/Sivut/default.aspx 
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that	is	valid	for	one	hour	by	sending	a	text	message,	but	no	season	tickets	or	otherwise	advanced	
opportunities	for	employers	to	pay	for	it	etc.	exist	(Juntunen	2010).		
The	Helsinki	Metropolitan	Area	Council	(YTV),	Helsinki	City	Transport,	and	the	railway	company	
VR	 acted	 as	 partners	 in	 introducing	 the	 Green	 Card.	 Usage	 of	 travel	 cards	 is	 recorded	 in	 a	
database.	This	information	can	be	accessed	to	aid	transport	capacity	planning.	The	movements	of	
travel	card	users	are	saved	and	can	be	accessed	for	later	retrieval.	The	data	from	the	transport	
system	 has	 been	 used	 for	 crime	 investigations	 in	 serious	 cases	 (Hosein	 2003).	 The	 Finnish	
Ministry	 of	 Transport	 and	 Communications	 are	 coordinating	 a	 stakeholder	 group	 where	 the	
future	of	regional	transport	integration	and	technology	solutions,	including	NFC	are	dealt	with.		
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Figure A3. The use case for Helsinki – NFC in public transport 
Helsinki	City	Transport’s	(HKL)	main	task	is	to	produce	tram	and	metro	services,	be	responsible	
for	Helsinki’s	track	infrastructure	and	promote	jointly	with	and	with	the	help	of	its	partners	the	
transport	 in	 the	 Helsinki	 region24.	 	 The	 usage	 of	 the	 Green	 Card	 is	 limited	 to	 the	 large	 urban	
areas.	The	Ministry	of	Transport	is	responsible	for	mediating	efforts	to	harmonise	the	two	main	
																																																																		
24 http://www.hel.fi/hki/hkl/en/About+HKL HKL employs over 1,000 public transport employees who 
drive trams and metro trains, control traffic, maintain equipment, track and property, plan and 
implement new projects. HKL’s turnover will reach approximately EUR 140 million in 2010. HKL’s 
most important partner is Helsinki Region Transport (HSL).	
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schemes	in	Finland,	the	other	scheme	is	jointly	operated	by	the	private	bus	companies.	According	
to	 a	 consultation	 carried	 out	 by	 Sulonen	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 the	 European	 experience	 has	 not	 been	
encouraging	in	terms	of	meeting	dead‐lines	and	economic	targets	in	launching	nationwide	travel	
card	schemes25,	and	they	recommend	to	make	current	systems	interoperable	instead	by	multiple	
readers	and	gradual	migration.	
SMS	tickets	are	also	available,	however	so	far	the	user	cannot	purchase	the	ticket	in	advance	and	
activate	 it	when	needed,	as	 the	 ticket‘s	validity	expires	 shortly	after	 it	 is	purchased.	Moreover,	
the	 user	 can	 only	 buy	 one	 type	 of	 ticket	 and	 cannot	 receive	 any	 discounts	 that	 they	 might	
otherwise	 be	 eligible	 for.	 In	 addition,	 the	 user	 can	 only	 pay	 the	 ticket	 post‐purchase	 on	 their	
mobile	phone	bill,	which	makes	 it	 impractical	 for	the	user‘s	employer	 to	pay	 for	 the	 ticket	and	
also	causes	issues	for	those	users	who	are	not	the	operator‘s	subscribers.	
Appendix	4	‐	Tokyo		
The	Japan	Context	
Tokyo	is	served	by	two	main	urban	transport	networks:	Japan	Rail	(JR)	operating	overland	trains	
and	the	metro	subway	system.	JR	was	gradually	privatized	starting	in	the	early	1990s	and	traded	
on	 the	 stock	 market	 2006	 onwards.	 JR	 East	 serving	 the	 metropolitan	 area	 of	 Tokyo	 had	 an	
average	of	more	 than	16	million	passengers	and	12500	 trains	operating	per	day	on	average	 in	
2009.	 JR’s	 total	 ticket	 revenues	 were	 1.6	 trillion	 yen	 (about	 £13bn)	 in	 2010.	 Even	 though	 JR	
operates	with	several	companies	throughout	Japan,	the	NFC	travel	card	“Suica”	is	interoperable	
with	major	rail	operators	in	Japan	(the	remaining	areas	in	west	Japan	to	be	integrated	by	2013)26.	
Privacy	 law	 in	 Japan	 is	 regulated	 through	 the	 constitution	 and	 overseen	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Internal	Affairs	and	Communications.		
The	Suica	Card	
In	November	2001,	an	NFC	 travel	 card	service	called	Suica	became	available	 in	424	 Japan	Rail	
East	 train	 stations	 located	 within	 100	 kilometres	 of	 central	 Tokyo	 (Bradley	 et	 al	 2005).	 JR	
																																																																		
25  As an example they mention the Netherlands where planning began in 2001, agreements were 
signed 2003, the first card was rolled out  2007, and the complete system was operational in 2009. 
26	 	http://www.jreast.co.jp/investor/factsheet/pdf/factsheet_09.pdf	
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enables	Suica	as	means	for	payment	at	retail	outlets	inside	its	train	stations	and	in	2009	was	the	
sixth	largest	operator	in	the	Japanese	domestic	retail	industry	(Nikkei	Shinbun	2009).	Currently	
all	mobile	 phones	 in	 the	 Japanese	market	 are	NFC	 enabled.	 NFC	 is	 used	 seamlessly	 for	 public	
transportation	 not	 only	 for	 ticketing	 but	 also	 for	 providing	 information	 such	 as	 maps	 and	
timetables	(Fitzpatrick	2011).	The	first	mobile	NFC	wallet	(Suica	Mobile)	was	launched	by	Felica	
Networks	 in	 2004,	 a	 joint	 venture	 owned	by	 Sony	 (53%),	DoCoMo	 (38%),	 and	 Japan	 railways	
(5%).	No	major	data	breaches	related	to	Suica	have	been	recorded	up	to	date.	
Mobile	wallets		
In	 order	 to	 achieve	 fast	 roll‐out	 of	 mobile	 NFC	 wallets	 DoCoMo	 set	 aside	 ¥20	 billion	 for	
subsidizing	 installation	 of	 NFC	 readers.	 Merchants	 received	 the	 subsidized	 reader/writers	 in	
exchange	 for	 a	 small	 fee	 for	 each	 transaction	 (about	 2%	 to	 3%).	 These	 fees	were	 lower	 than	
credit	card	fees,	which	averaged	3%	to	5%	for	small	merchants	(Bradley	et	al	2005).	The	Felica	
Networks	 business	model	 in	 the	 joint	 venture	 builds	 on	 three	 revenue	 streams	 (Bradley	 et	 al	
2005):	
	
1. License	 fees	 from	 carriers	 purchasing	mobile	 FeliCa	 chips	 (DoCoMo	was	 exempt	 from	
fees	as	one	of	the	founders	and	owners)	
2. Providing	 platform	 management	 services	 (transaction	 fees):	 Applications	 were	 not	
preinstalled	 on	 mobile	 FeliCa	 chips/phones;	 Instead	 users	 downloaded	 apps	 into	 5‐
kilobyte	memory	 area	 that	 had	 room	 for	 about	 5	 to	 10	 applications.	 FeliCa	Networks	
received	a	fee	for	every	app	a	user	download		
3. Hosted	 services	 (transaction	 fees):	 To	 provide	 application	 providers	 with	 hosted	
services	such	as	authentication	and	storage	of	apps	identity	users.		
	
Electronic	money	started	to	take	off	 in	 Japan	2005	onwards	with	a	steep	rise	 in	the	number	of	
cards	 issued	 from	30	million	 in	2005	 to	about	80	million	 in	2007.	The	value	of	 transactions	 is	
expected	to	increase	from	176	billion	yen	in	2006	to	3.269	trillion	yen	in	2012	(Sugiura	2009).	In	
Japan	 electronic	money	 is	 a	 competing	 force	with	 the	 credit	 card	 system,	 a	 trend	 also	 seen	 in	
Hong	Kong,	but	not	in	London	or	Helsinki.	In	April	2006	NTT	DoCoMo	started	its	“ID”	service,	an	
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NFC	wallet	scheme	offering	post‐paid	services	connected	to	a	credit	card	of	choice.	Users	are	able	
to	pay	for	purchases	of	up	to	10,000	yen	(Euro	65)	per	month	by	holding	their	handsets	close	to	
compatible	 reader	 devices.	 Purchase	 amounts	 appear	 on	 their	 monthly	 phone	 bills	 and	 users	
later	receive	the	invoice	from	the	credit	card	companies	(Ezell	2009).	
	
e-money schemes 
in Japan 
(offered by) 
EDY 
 
(Bitwallet) 
Suica 
 
(JR East) 
Nanako
	
(7‐Eleven)	
Waon
	
(EAON)	
ID	
	
(NTT	DoCoMo)	
	
Number	of	cards	
users	
66.2	million	
 
39.6 m 
 
15.1 m 
 
21.2 m 
 
16.3 m 
Number of 
available shops 
275 thousand 154k 86k 120k 524k 
	
Table	A3:	Major	e‐money	schemes	in	Japan.	Source:	Nikkei	MJ	(10	Oct,	2011)	
	
EDY	 is	 the	 largest	e‐money	scheme	 in	 Japan	with	more	than	10	million	mobile	e‐wallet	users	
and	part	of	on‐line	retail	 firm	Rakuten.	 	Users	of	EDY	and	other	NFC	schemes	can	either	user	
their	NFC	card	to	make	payments	or	download	the	associated	application	to	their	mobile	phone	
and	 use	 the	 built‐in	 NFC	 capability	 in	 their	 phone	 instead	 when	 making	 payments.		
	
Due	 to	 new	 business	models	 and	 opportunities	 for	 fraud	 emerging	 with	 the	 introduction	 of	
nationwide	 NFC	 payments	 a	 “payment	 agent	 registry	 system”	 has	 been	 introduced	 by	 the	
Consumer	 Affairs	 Agency	 (CAA)27.	 The	 registry	 system	 operates	 as	 follows:	 NFC	 payment	
agents	(third	party	payment	brokers)	need	to	register	 in	 the	 list	which	 is	made	public	by	 the	
CAA;	stores	should	clearly	display	if	they	use	agents,	if	they	are	registered,	and	contact	details	
for	the	agent;	if	this	information	is	not	displayed	properly	the	agent	will	be	removed	from	the	
list.		
The	 Prepaid	Card	 Law	 is	 influential	 on	NFC	payments.	However,	 there	 remains	 some	 lack	 of	
																																																																		
27  The Agency itself being established in Sep 2009 http://www.caa.go.jp/en/	
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clarity	with	regards	to	the	definition	of	electronic	money	(Sugiura	2009):	
“as	 opposed	 to	 promotional	 coupons,	 points,	 mileage	 and	 	 coupons	 earned	 through	
transactions	or	at	no	cost,	electronic	money	is		currently	issued	in	the	amount	deposited	
therein.	 	 Thus,	 electronic	money	 becomes	 ‘based	 on	 a	 contractual	 relationship	with	 a	
creditor,	that	which	is	issued	having	received	the	recorded	amount	as	consideration,	the	
transfer	of	which	has	the	effect	of	settling	a	range	of	monetary	obligations	authorized	by	
contract.’	
In	Japan	privacy	concerns	related	to	mobile	services	(NFC	was	only	a	minor	part	of	this)	led	the	
regulator	to	introduce	a	“PrivacyMark”,	introduced	on	April	1st	200528.	Privacy	has	been	taken	
seriously	in	Japan	by	the	regulator	and	service	providers	since	the	beginning	and	beyond	of	the	
mobile	Internet.	In	this	sense	NFC	privacy	became	for	the	Japanese	an	issue	much	earlier	than	in	
Europe,	due	to	more	advanced	and	potentially	intrusive	services	
Appendix 5 – The two  secondary cases: Seoul and Berlin 
Parallel to the main cases reviewed, we conducted a brief review of two secondary cases. They were 
chosen either for the well developed level of use of the NFC technology generally (Seoul), or in the 
case of Berlin for the strong and clear position of the bodies regulating privacy to be committed to 
protect it from abuses of the technology. 
Seoul  
In South Korea, SK Telecom initiated an ‘NFC Zone”29 with preliminary tests in 2010 using RFID30.   
In August 2011, SK Telecom declared that all new smartphones to be released in the South Korean 
market will be NFC enabled31. In Korea mobile consumers use NFC equipped phones for a range of 
small transactions, such as food and other small purchases, or parking payments.  
																																																																		
28 http://privacymark.org/ -  this website refers to a privacy certification that all firms handling 
personal data need to acquire	
29 The announcement was at at the GSMA's Mobile Money Summit in Singapore this year. 
30 http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/view/2372/2 
31 http://www.nearfieldcommunicationsworld.com/2011/08/01/38901/sk-telecom-all-new-smartphones-
must-come-with-nfc/ 
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An RFID Privacy Protection Guideline has been active since 200532 and also is applicable to NFC.  
Researchers in Korea have actively looked into the many uses of RFID and possible breaches of 
security, privacy and mobile systems. This literature is mainly technical and focusing on the ways to 
reinforce or detect security breaches. The body of relevant legislation focuses on defining the elements 
that communicate in RFID transactions, what is forbidden (e.g. recording personal information, using 
RFID tags to collect personal information, linking article information in an RFID tag to personal 
information). It also makes a clear distinction between tags that are built in or attached, which is a 
relevant difference when defining what is in use and what not.  
The legislation goes further towards explaining how the tag can be deactivated and making the user 
aware that this is the case. There is a clear ban on tag implantation in the human body, and the 
installation of an RFID reader needs to be clearly indicated and easy for a user to notice. The 
legislation is fully comprehensive in terms of how to manage the technical measure for the data 
protection, assessment of privacy, changes and enhancement of user awareness, management of data 
collected and even the review of the guidelines themselves. 
There is no similar legislation in place for Europe, or the UK, in terms of explicitly stating the 
boundaries of the use of the RFID or NFC tags. For example, the German approach, as we will see 
below focuses on the protection of privacy, which is a different approach from the Korean one, which 
focuses on the technology. The EU approach stresses the protocols to be used and how they can be 
used but is not explicit on banning for example RFID implantation in the body. 
Berlin  
Deutsche Bahn started trials on NFC with the help of Vodafone in 200833. Deutsche Telecom and O2 
Germany joined efforts and trials were completed in around 500 sites in Germany.  Their plan was to 
roll out NFC before the end of 2011, a feasible goal given that the infrastructure for readers is already 
place. Their view of an integrated, city, regional and national fare system34 for the use of NFC is a very 
different case from the situations of London and Hong Kong. 
																																																																		
32 The authors of this report only have been able to find an unofficial translation to the full content of 
the law at http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/PrivLRes/2005/3.html  
33 http://www.nfctimes.com/project/germany-three-telcos-join-national-railway-touchtravel-project 
34 http://www.smartinsights.net/?2011/03/10/369-national-nfc-transport-ticket-to-come-in-germany 
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Germany has taken the initiative in many aspects of NFC implementation and they have also been 
innovators in regulation at national and EU level.  Their view on establishing a business system for 
secure and trusted transactions of NFC is due in part to the strong lobbying of many NFC chip 
manufactures based in Germany.  The EU agreed in April 2011 to a smart tag deal based on self-
regulation that aims towards supporting the manufacturing industry35 and is consistent with German 
lobbying interests. 
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